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COMPELLED AFFIRMATIONS, FREE SPEECH, AND
THE U.S. MILITARY'S DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL
POLICY
Tobias Barrington Wolff
INTRODUCTION

Imagine the following scene. At an Air Force base outside
Colorado Springs, Colorado, early in 1996, two young officers
have gotten together after work to have some coffee and relax.
One of the two, Anne, is a lesbian. Since the time she entered
the service, Anne has assiduously avoided making any reference to her sexual orientation, as the Don't Ask, Don't Tell
policy requires. 1 None of her friends or fellow officers know

· ©1997 Tobias Barrington Wolff. All Rights Reserved.
1
Clerk, the Honorable Betty Binns Fletcher, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Yale Law School, J.D., 1997.
There are many people-4:olleagues and mentors alike-to whom I am
indebted for the assistance that they offered while I was writing this Article. I
owe my greatest debt of gratitude, however, to the gay and lesbian
servicemembers who agreed to lend me their experience and wisdom by granting
the interviews a round which this Article took shape. Because some of those
servicemembers must remain anonymous, I have decided not to thank any of them
by nam e; leaving any one of them out of such an acknowledgment would simply
be unacceptable. This Article would not have been possible without their
generosity. I dedicate this work to them and to the many tens of thousands of gay
men and lesbians who continue to render honorable service to our country in the
U.S. armed forc es .
For his scholarly guidance , I am especially indebted to Owen Fiss, who taught
me what the First Amendment is really all about. Glenn Edwards, whose
knowledge in the field of gay rights eclipses my own, was a constant source of
information, wisdom, and encouragement. Michelle Benecke of Servicemembers
Legal Defense Network put me in touch with many of my interview subjects and
enabled this Article to get off the ground. Greg Bowman, Betty Fletcher, Paul
Gewirtz, Ryan Goodman, William Norris, John Pottow, William Rubenstein,
Sandhya Subramanian, Cynthia Griffin Wolff, Robert Paul Wolff, Kenji Yoshino,
and the members of the Spring 1997 Sexual Orientation Workshop at Yale Law
School all gave the kind of serious critical attention to this Article that any
scholar would be thankful for. All errors are my own .
' S ee Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces, 10 U.S .C. § 654
(1997). The statute begins by listing fifteen legislative findings, the first fourteen
of which essentially offer arguments for the proposition made in the fifte enth, that
1141
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that Anne is gay, and Anne n ever talks about "gay issues"
around the base. The other officer, Nancy, is straight. Nancy

"[t] h e prese nce in the ar med forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or
intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high
standards of morale, good order and discipline , and unit cohesion that are the
essence of military capability." Id. § 654(a)(15). The statute goes on to require that
a member of the armed forces be se parated from the service on a finding of one
or more of the following:
(1 ) That the member h as engaged in , attempted to engage in, or
so licited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts unless there are
further findings, made a nd approved in accord a nce with procedures set
forth in such regulations , that the member has demonstrated that(A) such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and customary behavior;
(B) such condu ct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely to r ecur;
(C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or
intimidation;
(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the member's
continued presence in the armed forces is consistent with the interests of
the armed forc es in proper discipline, good order, and morale; a nd
(E) the m embe r does not have a propensity or intent to engage in
homosexual acts.
(2) Tha t the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or
bisexual, or words to that effect, unless there is a further finding, made
and approved in accordance with procedures set forth in the regulations,
that the member has demonstrated that he or she is not a person who
engages in , attempts to engage in , has a propensity to engage in, or
intends to engage in homosexual acts.
(3) That the member h as married or attempted to marry a person
kn ow n to be of the same biological sex.
Id. § 654(b)
The sta tute's definition of "homosexual a ct" reads as follows:
(3) The term "homosexua l act" means(A) any bodily contac t, actively undertaken or passively permitted ,
between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual
desires; and
(B) any bodily contact which a reasonable person would und erstand
to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in an act described in
subparagraph (A).
Id. § 654(0 (emphasis added).
This definition includes not only sexua l activity as traditionally understood, but
also behavior such as hugging or hand-holding. See Able v. United States, 88 F .3d
1280, 1291 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that "homosexual conduct" includes
"handholding" ). In contrast, the only formal limita tions that the military places on
a h eterosexual servicemember's choice of sexua l acts (as distinguished from the
servicemember's choice of sexual partners) a re found in the Uniform Code of Milit ary Justice's criminal penalties for sodomy-anal a nd oral sex. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 925(a) (1997), codified at U.C.M.J. a rt. 125 ; see also Able, 88 F.3d at 1291
(" [T]here is no doubt that the Act treats homosexuals and heterosexuals differently
even thou gh they have engaged in similar acts within a broad range (from
handholding to intercourse).").
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has known Anne since the two started officer training together
a few years earlier. The following conversation-an unremarkable one for the two fri ends-takes place on a wintry Tuesday
evenmg.
Nancy:

So what are you doing for Eas ter next month?

Anne:

Goin g to my folks'
Once I gradu ated
home, my parents
tremely Important
You?

Nancy:

I'm going with Dave to visit his family in Michigan.

Anne:

And are we h appy about these plans?

Nancy:

Oh, Dave's family is great. Dave himself, however, turns
into a space alien whenever we go to visit them. [They
laugh.] Oh, Annie, you know how a ma n acts when he
takes you home to meet the family for the first time,
right?

Anne:

[Anne's eyes drop for a moment and her smile fades a
bit.] I ... guess we all know about that.

Nancy:

Well, Dave hasn't quite managed to move beyond that
phase yet. I figured that he would loosen up around his
family after we got engaged last fall, but that hasn't happened. If anything, he's gotten more uptight.

Anne:

At least it probably means that Dave won't m ake you visit
the in-laws too frequently after you two get married.

Nancy:

True, true. Still, I suggest you stand far away from the
bouquet toss at our wedding this summer. Believe me, you
have enough to worry about in "this man's Air Force"
without also taking on a man's set of issues with his family! [Nancy laughs heartily; after a slight hesitation, Anne
joins in .]

house, probably. [She smiles wryly.]
from high sch ool and actually left
decid ed that the holidays were ExEvents th at r equired my attendance.

This is the most prosaic of scenes. It is the type of conversation
that any one of us might expect to have with a friend or acquaintance. It also illustrates the heart of the First Amendment right that is burdened by the U.S. military's Don't Ask,
Don't Tell policy ("DADT"): the right not to be compelled to
make a false affirmation of one's identity, ideas or beliefs.
Unlike the blanket exclusion that preceded it, the Don't Ask,
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Don't Tell policy permits gay people to serve in the military. 2
It does so, however, only on condition that they acquiesce in
lies-indeed, that they lie actively-about the most personal
aspects of their lives and their identities . The new policy does
more than mandate mere silence; it compels gay
servicemembers to make involuntary and false affirmations of
a heterosexual identity that is not their own. It imposes, in
other words, what the Supreme Court pronounced in "\-Vest
Virginia State Board of Education u. Barnette3 to be among
the most serious of burdens on an individual's First Amendment rights: to "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion [and] force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." 4
It is impossible to be "agnostic" as to one's sexual orientation in the course of normal social interactions. Rather, there
is a presumption of heterosexuality that pervades our lives. In
all but the most unusual of circumstances, people will assume
that any given individual is straight unless they have reason
to believe otherwise . That assumption informs every conversation and interaction. 5 People's most ordinary statements and

2
Each branch of the service has issued regulations under the new policy that
make it clear that gay men and lesbians are now allowed to serve in the military
while at the sam e time imposing special burdens on their speech ri ghts . For exa mple , the Navy's implementing regula tion und er the po licy reads, in p ertinent
pa rt, as follows:
A person's sexual orienta tion is consid ered a person a l a nd priva te matter,
and is not a bar to service entry or continued s ervi ce unless ma nifested
by homosexual conduct. During the a ccession process , a ll applicants, prospects a nd members of the dep [sic] sha ll not be as ked or req uired to
reveal wh ether they a re heterosexua l, homosexu a l or bisexual a nd will
not be as ked or required to reveal if they have engaged in homosexual
conduct unless independ ent evidence is r eceived indicating that the applicant engaged in such conduct or unless the applica nt volunteers a statement that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual or words to that effect.
Navadmin 033/94 PP 4, 9.C(3). See also DoD Directive 1332.14.H.l.a (1993) ("Sexua l orientation is considered a persona l a nd private ma tter, and homosexual orientation is not a bar to continued service unless m anifested by homosexual conduct."); Able, 88 F.3d at 1298 ("[T]he Act does not bar those who have a homosexual orientation but are not likely to enga ge in homosexu a l a cts.").
3
319 U.S . 624 (1943).
' Id. at 642.
5
As Professor Janet H a lley has written, "To borrow the langua ge of semiology, the public status 'h eterosexual' is a n unmarked signifier, the category to
which everyone is assumed to belong. Something has to happen to m a rk an individual with t he identity, 'homosexual.' " J a net E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet:
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questions regularly carry with them the presumption that
those with whom they are speaking are straight, just like
Nancy's half of the conversation does in the scene reproduced
above . Moreover, a gay person's silence in such a situation is
not a neutral response; rather, silence serves to reaffirm this
"heterosexual presumption." \Vhen a gay person does not disabuse others of the erroneous presumptions of heterosexuality
that they have made-when Anne is silent about her gay identity, for example, in the face of Nancy's comments and questions-she is affirming a straight identity as surely as if she
actually framed the lie in words. And silence frequently is not
sufficient-or even feasible-when one attempts to hide a gay
identity. Gay people are sometimes forced to lie actively about
who they are if they wish to keep their identities hidden. For a
gay person, in other words, the experience of being in the closet is not an experience of having no public sexual identity at
all; it is one of pretending to be straight. When silence as to
one's gay identity is compelled, at all times and in all situations, this false affirmation of heterosexuality is compelled, as
well. A policy that permits gay people to serve in the military
but prohibits them ever from identifying themselves as gay is a
policy that compels gay servicemembers falsely to identify
themselves as straight. 6
Among the Federal Courts of Appeals that have analyzed
the constitutionality of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy under
the First Amendment, 7 none has understood the nature, or the

Towards Equal Protection for Gay, L~:Sbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 915, 946 (1989).
6
Professor Nan Hunter made this point concisely at the end of her Commen·
tary in the Virginia Law Review.
[S]uppression of identity speech leads to a compelled falsehood, a
violation of the principle that an individual has the right not to speak as
well as to speak. In the absence of identity speech, most persons are
assumed to be heterosexual. To paraphrase the ACT-UP slogan, silent =
straight. To compel silence, then, is to force persons who are not heterosexual in effect to lie.
Nan D. Hunter, Commentary, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695,
1718 (1993).
7
See Holmes v. California Army Nat'! Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997);
Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 45
(1997); Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, SO
F.3d 915 (4th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 358 (1996). Shortly before
this Article went to press, the Ninth Circuit issued an order denying en bane
review in Holmes that was accompanied by a dissent from the denial of rehearing
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extent, of the burden that the policy places on gay
servicemembers' speech rights. Those courts have framed their
analysis in terms of the evidentiary use to which the military
puts a servicemember's statement that she is gay. They have
concluded that, if same-sex sexual behavior may be regulated,
then a servicemember's speech about her gay identity may
legitimately be us ed as s ufficient evidence of her "propensity"
to engage in the forbidden homos exual acts. Such an analysis,
whatever its technical m erits , fails to address the core of the
policy's imp a ct: the fals e affirmation of heterosexual identity
that the policy constantly forces upon gay servicemembers.
This Article seeks to unite some of the Supreme Court's
traditional First Amendment jurisprudence with a commonsense account of the lived experience of gay men and lesbians
in order to provide the understanding that has heretofore been
lacking in judicial review of the policy. 3 It takes as its starting

e n bane by Jud ge H a rry Pregerson. See Holmes v. Cal iforn ia Nat'! Army Guard,
N o. 96-157 26 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 1998) (order denying rehearing en bane). The dissent, which was joined by Jud ges Reinhardt, Kozinski , H awkins and Tashima,
touches briefly upon the thesis of this Article. See id. (Pregerson , J., dissenting)
("From another perspective, as a practical matter the silence that this policy imposes on gay and lesbia n military personne l can lead others to presume that they
assent to a view about their own sexuality that they do not es pouse.").
8
In his paradi gm-shifting analysis of the Suprem e Court's decis ion in B owers
u. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), Professor Kend all Thomas properly criticizes
those legal scholars who complacently accept the conceptual frameworks offered by
t he Supreme Court in conducting their analyses of individual claims of rig ht, particula rly in the realm of privacy.
[I]f one believes, as I do, that the intellectua l concerns and commitments
of students of constitutional jurisprudence overlap but a re not congruent
with those of the Supreme Court itself, one might well ask whether this
strategy of assessing the Court's work exclusively or primarily on its own
terms helps or hinders the dis tinctively critical project of constitutional
scholars hip .
Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 , 1435
(1992). Professor Thomas makes this criticism the launching-off point for his own,
radical and virtuosic analysis.
This Article proceeds fro m the premise that, in the realm of the First Amendment, the Court's well-established doctrines are, in fact , entirely sufficient to produce a meaningful and sophisticated a nalysis of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. It
aims its challen ge at the failure of those judges who h ave reviewed the policy to
und erstand the lived experience of gay men and lesbians and to recognize the applicability of those doctrines to that experience-a species of challenge that Thomas a lso invokes, to powe rful effect. See id. a t 1498-99. I attribute this difference
in ap proac h to a m eaningful difference in the state of the law in the areas of
freedom of expression and of privacy, a s ubject that I will a ddress, briefly, later
on. See infra notes 81-92, 185 and accompanying text.
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point, in Part I, the stories of gay and lesbian
servicemembers-those who have served under the Don't Ask,
Don't Tell policy and those who served under the blanket exclusion that preceded it. Their stories illustrate the impact
that the forcibly imposed closet of the new policy has upon the
gay people whom the military now formally invites to join its
ranks. They give needed depth and substance to the harms
that the Court first identified in West Virginia u. Barnette .9
The Article then goes on to provide an approach for conducting
a proper First A.rnendment analysis of Don't Ask, Don't Tell.
Part II analyzes the policy's reliance on the expressive power
of the silence of gay and lesbian servicemembers and discusses
the Court's treatment of silence in its First Amendment jurisprudence. Part III examines the special relationship that exists
between compelled affirmations and identity speech. Finally,
Part IV draws these strands together and scrutinizes the policy
through the lens of West Virginia v. Barnette.
I. THE SOUNDS OF SILENCE: STORIES OF GAY SERVICEMEMBERS
IN THE MILITARY

Any author who chooses to incorporate individual narratives into a legal analysis bears the burden of explaining the
purpose for which those narratives are offered. This is especially true following the powerful critique that Professors Daniel
Farber and Suzanna Sherry have levied at the haphazard use
of personal narratives that they believe has characterized
much recent scholarship. 10 Farber and Sherry take particular
aim at feminist legal scholars and critical race theorists, whom
they criticize for attempting to escape the scrutiny of traditional, rigorous scholarly standards. 11 Such scholars, they explain,
frequently claim to write from a unique and distinctive per-

9

In her analysis of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy, Professor Halley has
emphasized what she calls "an important aspect of [gay servicemembers'] bringing
their challenge to the public forum of the federal district court: the opportunity to
display to the court the actual human beings upon whom the Statute stood ready
to operate." Janet E. Halley, The Status I Conduct Distinction in the 1993 Revisions
to Military Anti-Gay Policy: A Legal Archaeology, 3 GAY L. Q. 159, 182 (1996).
10
See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An
Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993).
11
See id. at 809-19.
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spective-to speak in a "different voice" 12 that cannot easily
be translated into the analytic prose of legal analysis and so
cannot be evaluated by traditional standards. Farber and Sherry reject such strong claims of narrative prerogative . Instead,
they "suggest that legal scholarship should help the reader
understand law , and that legal scholarship should comport
with the goals and attributes of the academy." 13 Thus, while
they unreservedly embrace the proposition that "some storytelling is a legitimate form of legal scholarship," 14 Farber and
Sherry insist that scholars "take greater steps to ensure that
their stories are accurate and typical, to articulate the legal
relevance of the stories, and to include an analytic dimension
in their work." 15 "The crucial test of scholarly writing," they
conclude, "must be whether it provides an increased understanding of some issue relating to law." 16
For present purposes, this Article need not engage with
the broader implications of Farber and Sherry's challenge, as
the purpose for which it offers the interviews that follow is a
relatively conservative one. The Article seeks to demonstrate
that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy imposes burdens on the
expressive rights of gay and lesbian servicemembers that can
readily be described under the Supreme Court's existing First
Amendment jurisprudence, but that the federal courts have
failed to produce a meaningful analysis of the policy because
they have simply failed to understand how the dynamics of the
closet actually operate in the everyday lives of gay people. 17
12
! d. at 809. The term comes from Carol Gilligan's pathbreaking work of the
same name. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
AND WOM EN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
13
Farber & Sherry, supra note, at 809 .
" !d. a t 808. For an example of Farber and Sherry's own use of narrative in
legal an a lysis, see Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Pri nciple, 13
CONST. COMMENT. 257, 265 (1996).
15
F arbe r & She rry , supra note, at 809.
16
Farber & Sherry, supra note 10, at 824. See also Ka thryn Abrams, Hearing
the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 , 1030 (1991) (" [I]t seems reasonable to as k
of narrators who are, in fact, legal scholars that their stories be framed in s uch a
way as to shed light on legal questions.").
17
Thus, this Article utilizes individu a l narra tive for a purpose that is narrower
than those proposed by Professor Willi a m E skridge in his response to Farber and
Sherry. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. , Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607
(1994) . Eskridge argues that "gaylaw provides a particularly attractive field for
n arra tives, even under the conse rvative criteria laid out by Farber and Sherry," id.
at 6 10, precisely because gay peop le and their stories have been actively repressed
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Indeed, this failure of understanding has amounted to what
Professor Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has termed a "privilege of
unknowing." 18 Sedgwick has observed that it can be an effective tool for wielding social power to remain ignorant of the
cultural identity or experiences of others. "If IYI. Mitterand
knows English but Mr. Reagan lacks French," for example, "it
is the urbane M. Mitterand who must negotiate in an acquired
tongue, the ignorant Mr. Reagan who may dilate in his n ative
one." 19 More gener ally, "it is the interlocutor who has or pretends to have the less broadly knowledgeable understanding of
interpretive practice who will define the terms of the exchange."20 Sedgwick's observation certainly holds true in legal
analysis, where the ability of a claimant to benefit from an
established legal doctrine is always limited by the ability of a
judge to recognize, after engaging in a formal dialogue with the
claimant, that the doctrine in question should in fact apply. 2 1
Thus, the interviews in this Article are offered for the purpose
of demonstrating a crucial fact about the lived experience of
gay people that has heretofore been absent from judicial review
of the policy: that forcing a gay person to remain silent about
her sexual identity, at all times and in all places, in fact forces
her to affirm a heterosexual identity that is not her own, and
so to live a lie.
I take Professor Susan Bandes' recent article on the use of
victim impact statements in capital sentencing hearings to
offer a powerful endorsement of such a use of individual narrative.22 In denouncing the Supreme Court's validation of victim
in American jurisprudence, remaining hidden and invisible until very recently. He
then provides a rich a ccount of the particular difficulties that gay claimants ca n
encounter in legal settings. Es krid ge argues persuasively that gay narratives can
have a transformative impa ct by demonstrating the hidden inequities in s tate
policies, see id. at 611-17 , or the connections among seemingly unrelated policies,
see id. at 617-21 ; can offer challenges to the categorical ass umptions upon which
policies and legal doctrines fr equently rest, see id. at 621-30; and can reinforce
activist political movements , giving focus to radical challenges to the proper scope
of law and state regula tion, see id. at 630-40.
18
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Privilege of Unknowing: Diderot's The Nun, in TENDENCIES 23 (1993).
19 !d.
20 !d.
21
See Thomas, supra note 8 , at 1456 ("It is precisely this 'ignorance effect'
that provides an ideological anchor for the oppression of gays and lesbians, which
the secrecy of the 'closet' has historically aimed to mitiga te.").
22
See Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U.
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impact statements, 23 Professor Bandes argues that the propriety of introducing individual narratives into formal legal analysis depends in large part on the extent to which those narratives have, or have not, already been taken into account in the
process of articulating and administering a legal doctrine. 24
The impact of violent crime upon its victims, she concludes,
suffers from no infirmity in this regard: 'n.vVe do not need elaborate structures to assist us in feeling fear, pain, and grief for
those like us who have suffered violence at the hands of the
other. This is already the domin ant narrative of the criminal
trial. "25 Because the story of the victim of a violent crime is
one of the primal, animating forces that gave rise to the criminal justice system in the first place, the heavy-handed reintroduction of that story into the ongoing administration of the
system adds very little and threatens to distort or unbalance
the decision making process. Similarly, in order for a newspaper to argue to a court that it ought to be able to invoke the
doctrine forbidding prior restraints when it is threatened with
a restrictive injunction, it need not provide a highly personalized account of the harms that the paper, its readership, and
the larger community will suffer if it is enjoined from publishing its controversial story. The doctrine of prior restraint grew
out of the Court's painfully adequate understanding of those
precise harms. Rather, it is when courts demonstrate a complete inability to mediate between general rules and particular
cases in this fashion that it is most clearly necessary for individual narrative to reenter legal analysis. 26

CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996).
23

See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (overruli':lg Booth v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496 (1987)).
24
See Bandes, supra note 22, at 382-90.
25
Bandes, supra note 22, at 409.
26
I borrow this phrase from Professor Mark Tushnet, who has written at
length about the use of narrative in legal scholarship . See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet,
The Flag-Burning Episode: An Essay on the Constitution, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 39
(1990); Mark V. Tushnet, A Worthy Tradition: Fre edom of Speech in America, 14
L. & Soc . INQUIRY 539 (1989) (book review). In one ess ay, Tushnet summarizes
his approach , arguing that "constitutional adjudication [should be) the vehicle we
use to mediate particular cases and general rules." Mark V. Tushnet, Colloquy,
The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251 (1992). Acknowledging the particular capacity of narrative to ground legal a nalysis in concrete experience, Tushnet asserts that a proper use of narrative is one that facilitates this
mediation between the particular and the general , rather than distorting or ob-
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In theory, then, these interviews should be unnecessary to
this Article's project. If a legal audience could be relied upon to
recognize the most basic facts about the everyday lives of gay
men and lesbians and to understand how those facts map onto
the existing analytical framework of the First Amendment,
then the Article could simply proceed directly to its constitutional analysis. 27 But the performance of the federal judiciary
in its analysis of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy has made it
clear that, at least for now, something more is needed in order
to ensure that the claims of gay servicemembers are heard and
understood. 28
Twenty-one individuals from all different parts of the
country and all different branches of the armed forces agreed
to be interviewed for this Article. Most served under the Don't
Ask, Don't Tell policy and have recently left the military. A
number were litigants in challenges brought against the policy

structing it. See id. at 256-58, 258-60, 297-310. Und er Tushnet's approach, then ,
the function of the interviews in this Article is to inj ect into judicial revi ew of the
Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy some of the particularities of t he lives of gay
servicemembers that have thus far been absent. In other words, this Article's
contention-to use Tushnet's terms-is that the necess ary process of medi a tion has
never occurred in judicial review of the policy because the relevan t particularities
have been entirely absent from the court's understanding. Thus, it is not simply
the case that judges have engaged in the process of mediation tha t Tushnet calls
for and have come up with flawed results; rather, through their ignorance, they
have bypassed that process altogether.
27
In some feminist legal scholarship, in contrast, narratives constitute a vital
component of an article's thesis. The work of some feminist scho lars emphasizes
the importance of concreteness and particularity-as opposed to abstraction and
generalization-in structuring normative arguments and rules of law. See Abrams,
supra note 16, at 975-76 (discussing different strands of feminist methodology).
Similarly, some feminist scholars have levied challenges at th e legitimacy of the
imparti al, authoritative voice of linear reason in which most traditional lega l scholarship gro unds itse lf. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 16, at 976, 987; Marie Ashe,
Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction" and the Law ,
13 NOVA L. REV. 355 (1989) (bringing these methods to bear on issue of women's
reprod uctive ri ghts). For these scholars, individual n arrative is a vital component
of their work; it is partly constitutive of their arguments. This Article makes no
such claims.
28
In characterizing that "something more ," Professor Richard Delgado has written that "(s)tories, parables, chronicles, and narratives a re powerful mean s for destroying mindset- the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, an d shared
understandings against a background of which legal and politica l discourse takes
place." Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2413 (1988). See also Thomas, supra note 8 , at
1498- 99.
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in federal court. A few are still serving on active duty. The
interviews took place between February and August of 1997 .
The texts of the interviews are drawn from servicemembers'
responses to broad , open-end ed questions about their experiences living under the policy and, in particular, the ways in
which the policy has forced them to prevaricate or lie. Every
individual who agreed to participate in these interviews had
already devoted a great deal of thought to the issues of identity
and personal integrity that the Article explores-a fact that
probably comes as no surprise to most gay and lesbians readers , whether they have served in the military or not. Gay men
a nd lesbians must regularly make decisions about how to navigate their own personal closets-how to "manage" public
knowledge of their sexual identities in the face of the persistent presumption that everyone is heterosexual unless proven
otherwise. 29 It should come as no surprise to find that gay

29
Professor Kenji Yoshino provides a cogent descrip tio n of this dynamic in
questioning the propriety of the "closet" as a symbol for the problem of sexu a l
self-definition:
Gays can never be out and done with it; they must continually reiterate
their sexual orientation against a heterosexist presumption that reinstates
itself at every pause. The most da maging failure of the closet symbol is
perhaps that it misrepresents the continuum of a person's disclosure of
his or her homosexual orientation as a binary constructed from the endpoints of that continuum. One is either "out" or "closeted": the closet
with its rigid door between the "o uts ide" and the "inside" does not lend
itself to subtler gradations. Howeve r , these gradations are not only relevant, but crucial to an understanding of gay oppression. First, gays come
out in a gradual process that is misrep resen ted by a construct that
marks some point as the point at which they "come out." Second, most
gays disclose their homosexuality to some but not to others-for example
to their fam ilies but not their co-workers, or vice-versa-in a way that
the closet, which does not perform such discrimina tion between audiences,
fails to reflect. Fina lly, because it is impossible for any gay to be fully
"out" or "closeted," the endpoints of the continuum on which the binarism
is based do not exist.
Kenj i Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for
Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1810-11 (1996). Professor Halley has given a similar account of the presumption's operation:
[B] ecause the assumption of heterosexuality applies in virtually every
social interaction-from the encounter of teacher with student, salesperson with shopper, mother with daughte r , Suprem e Court Justice with
clerk-even the mos t forth ri ght and fearless gay man or lesbian cannot
"come out" once and for all in a single public disclosure; as she moves
from one social setting to another, she will have to come out afresh or
acquiesce in the assignment to h er of a nonreferential public iden tity.
Halley, supra note 5, at 947.
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and lesbian servicemembers, whose careers frequently depend
upon their success in managing their public identities, have
devoted careful thought to that "identity management" process
and the questions of honor and integrity that it raises. 30 The
lies that gay and lesbian servicemembers are forced to tell
about themselves under the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy are, to
say the least, a matter of active concern for them.
Under normal circumstances, members of the military
regularly have free or unstructur ed time, and most
servicemembers began their interviews by focusing on that
portion of their duty. A consistent theme that runs throughout
their accounts is the regularity with which the most ordinary
of social discourse in the military can implicitly bring an
individual's sexual orientation into issue. Indeed, this implicit
introduction of sexual orientation into social discourse frequently does not lie far beneath the surface. The interview of
former Navy Lieutenant Tracy Thorne speaks to this issue.
Thorne entered the Navy after graduating from Vanderbilt
University. He trained as a pilot and flew an A-6 Intruder
fighter plane until being separated and discharged after coming out of the closet on the television show, "Nightline." He has
brought a challenge to the policy in federal court that is still
ongoing. 31 Speaking with hints of a light, formal Tennessee

30

As Professor H a ll ey h as pointed out, it is discrimination, in particul ar, that
forces gay people to focus s uch scrupulous attention on both their private conceptions and the public's perception of their identities:
Antihomosexual discrimination encourages people to manipulate the identity they attach to themselves, both in the· secrecy of their own minds
and on the public stage, in what I shall call their subjective and their
public identities. It ensures that personal desires, sexua l behavior, subjective identity a nd public id entity will frequently get out of sync with each
other. However carefu lly an individual disposes these eleme nts, they are
all subject to sudden , either joyous or catastrophic, rearrangement.
Halley, supra note 5, at 933.
31
In 1993 , Thorne brought suit in the Eastern District of Virginia to challenge
the constitutionality of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. While he initially met
with some success in district court, that favorabl e disposition was vacated in light
of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Thomasson u. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996)
(en bane). See Thorne v. Dep't of Defense, 916 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Va. 1996). On
remand following Thoma sson, Thorne lost his case. See Thorne v. Dep't of Defense ,
945 F. S upp. 924 (E.D. Va. 1996). His appeal is currently pending in the Fourth
Circuit.
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accent, Thorne describes the atmosphere that prevailed among
the "fly boys" who were his peers and buddies while he was
still on active duty.
The general thing tha t you faced on a regul a r basis was th at, pa rticularly being in a Naval aviation squadron, there's this kind of
swashbuckling m entality amon g the junior officers. For example,
where I was stationed at Virginia Beach , t hey ha d what was considered to be the ultim ate Officer's Club. Wh en I was there, through
the early 90s, it was fill ed with local women hunting for husbands,
femal e strippers-it was one big party, with Navy pilots flying in
from all around the country. The "thing to do" in your fre e time was
to he ad down to the 0' Club. If you didn't wa nt to head down there
and ogle the bare-breasted wom en with all th e other guys, people
would ask questions. Sometimes you could qui etl y sneak aw ay, but,
you know, you couldn't always do tha t, so yo u had to make like you
were enjoying it. 32

Moreover, as Thorne goes on to say, even those times when he
could "quietly sneak away" were not free from difficulty.
Friends naturally want to know how we spend our free time,
and buddies in the military are no different. Spending time
with gay friends, however, is something that no gay
servicemember can speak about with any candor. Thorne describes the dilemma that he and many others have faced.
After a typical weekend, I would show up at the squadron on a Monday morning, and everyone would ask, "WhJ.t did you do this weekend?" I couldn't tell them, for example, that I went to a movie on a
date. I would have to make stuff up , like that I worked on my ca r or
something.33

Indeed, one's sexual orientation is r egularly brought into
issue in settings that are less explicitly concerned with sexual
titillation than the "0' Club" scene that Lieutenant Thorne
describes. A story from former Air Force Captain Elizabeth
Hillman is typical of many others. Hillman spent most of her
active duty time working as an or bital analyst at Cheyenne
Mountain Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado. She
retired from the military after satisfYing her obligation to the
Air Force in 1996 and has since enrolled as a student at Yale
Law School. Speaking methodically and with frank openness,

32

Telephone Interview with Tracy Thorne, form er Lieutenant, United States
Navy (Apr. 22, 1997) [hereinafter Thorne Interview].
33 !d.
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Hillman tells of the complications that the heterosexual presumption can cause in the close relationships that exist among
peers in the service.
Because you can't speak up about your sexual orientation, you can't
put people at ease if they feel uncomfortable with the amount of
time you're spending with their partners. Wives and girlfriends can
easily feel threatened by the close working conditions between men
and women in the service, and there are times when you really want
to put someone at ease and tell her that she doesn't have to worry
about you going after her partner, but you can't do that if the reason
is that you're gay. For that matter, a woman will often get even
more nervous about your close working relationship with her partner because you're not reassuring her by telling her that you already
have a boyfriend or a husband. You frequently wind up inventing
stories anyway, to defuse a difficult situation .... One time in particular that this was a problem for me was when I was training for a
marathon with [a male friend]. ... Obviously, we were training
together, alone, for hours every clay. His wife was feeling threatened
by the amount of time that we were spending together, and there
was nothing I could say to explain that she didn't need to feel
threatened unless I made something up or told her that I was a
lesbian. 34

Such dilemmas are not limited to servicemembers' free
time. The workplace also presents many seemingly innocuous
situations in which the sexual orientation of servicemembers is
inexorably brought into issue, as a story from Anonymous
Officer Number One can attest. Anonymous Officer Number
One is a woman and a senior officer currently serving on active
duty in the armed forces. She requested that her name, branch
of service, and other identifying information be kept confidential because she feared that she would be vulnerable to reprisals if anyone suspected that she had made a contribution to
this Article. Anonymous Officer Number One is an experienced
and formidable professional, but her voice carried an edge of
apprehension and fear throughout the entire course of our interview. In speaking of the conditions under which she must
work as a closeted lesbian, she describes details that the most
careful examination by an outsider seeking to understand the
true impact of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy might easily
overlook.

34

Interview with Elizabeth Hillman, former Captain, United States Air Force,
in New Haven, Conn. (Mar. 31, 1997) [hereinafter Hillman Interview].

,.
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Another thing is photos on my desk, at work. It's a pretty standard
thing in the office to put pictures of husbands and boyfriends-past
or present-in prominent places on your desk. Usually, when I walk
into another woman's office, if I see pictures of pets and family on
her desk instead of men, I assume she might be gay. For the same
reason, I don't put pictures like that on my own desk--even though
I have a beautiful dog that I'd love to show off. In fact, I've thought
about putting pictures of male friends on my desk and making like
they're former boyfriends, just to deflect attention. I certainly have
[lesbian] friends who have done that. 35

The stresses on gay servicemembers to present a heterosexual identity at the workplace can also be applied in a less
subtle fashion. Many of the men interviewed for this Article
talked about the pervasiveness of homophobic jokes and comments among their peers in the military, and traditional
workplace settings provided no respite from such banter. Former Naval Academy Midshipman Joseph Steffan describes
such comments as constituting nothing less than an "institutionalized" practice. 36 Steffan was discharged from the Naval

35
Interview with Anonymous Officer Number One, Senior Officer, United
States Military (April 17, 1997) [hereinafter Anonymous Interview Number One].
In a highly influential essay, Adrienne Rich discusses the impact of what she
terms "compulsory heterosexuality" on lesbians as individuals and on the women's
movement more generally. See Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and
Lesbian Existence, in BLOOD, BREAD AND POETRY 22 (1986). Expanding upon work
begun by Katherine MacKinnon, Rich analyzes the particular set of enforced behaviors that gay women face in the workplace setting:
A lesbian, closeted on her job because of heterosexist prejudice, is not
simply forced into denying the truth of her outside relationships or private life. Her job depends on her pretending to be not merely heterosexual, but a heterosexual woman in terms of dressing and playing the feminine, deferential role required of "real" women.
Id. at 41-42.
36
Interview with Joseph Steffan, former Midshipman, United States Naval
Academy, in Hartford, Conn. (Feb. 25, 1997) [hereinafter Steffan Interview].
Steffan's observation echoes Professor Thomas' account of the role that homophobic
violence-whether realized physically or verbally-plays in the oppression of gay
men and lesbians.
The terroristic dimensions of homophobic violence compel us to understand it as a mode of power. To put the point in slightly different terms,
homophobic violence is a form of "institution." . . . Homophobic violence
is a social activity "structured by rules that define roles and positions,
powers and opportunities, thereby distributing responsibility for consequences."
Thomas, supra note 8, at 1467 (quoting Claudia Card, Rape as a Terrorist Institution, in VIOLENCE, TERRORISM, AND JUSTICE 296, 297-98 (R.G. Frey & Christopher
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Academy in 1987 after revealing that he was gay. He unsuccessfully challenged the blanket-exclusion policy that preceded
Don't Ask, Don't Tell. 37 Almost ten years after being formally
separated from the military, Steffan's demeanor, appearance
and surroundings are still highly ordered and efficient. Recalling the atmosphere of the Naval Aca demy, he describes the
frequency with which he found it difficult not to "join in on the
joke" when hi s peers would make homophobic comments because he could not give an honest account of his objections to
such remarks without revealing his own sexual orientation.
One incident in particular stood out in his mind during our
interview.
I served at times on a battalion performance board-a board that
reviewed and monitored the quality of individua ls' work in the battalion. At one point, the board had to review the performance of a
particular midshipman who was not doing very well. When the midshipman showed up for his review hearing, he had his hair parted
straight down the middle. Another member of the Board-a senior
battalion commander-took one look at him and said, "Go back and
comb that part out of your hair, you look like a fucking faggot!" In
that context, there was no way that I could object to a comment like
that without calling my own sexual orientation into question. For
that matter, I couldn't have explained why I found the comment
inappropriate and offensive without explaining that I was gay. I had
to continue with the review and act like I thought that telling someone that he looks like a "faggot" was an appropriate way to dress
him down .38

W. Morris eds., 1991 )).
37
See Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C:. Cir. 1994) (en bane).
38
Steffan Intervi ew, supra note 36. Michelle Benecke, the Executive Director of
Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, confirms that Steffan's experience is a
common one:
It's not enough, even, to be silent in the face of anti-gay harassmen t ;
they also have to participate or they're going to be thought to be gay.
You cannot be neutraL When you're neutra l, peop!e notice. This is an
environment where people work together very closely to accomplish a
mission. If people are trying to mask a life or pretend they don't have
one, it sticks out like a sore thumb. You have to affi rmatively invent a
heterosexual life. Part of that means joining in on the harassment that is
about you.
Telephone Interview with Michelle Benecke, Executive Director, Servicemembers
Legal Defense Network (Apr. 28, 1997) [hereinafter Benecke Interview). Professor
Marc Fajer has made similar observations. See Marc A Fajer, Can Two Real Men
Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotyp es, and Legal Protection for
Lesbians and Gay Men , 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 592 (1992). See also STUDS
TERKEL, THE GOOD WAH: AN ORAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR TWO 180 (1984);
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Incidents like the one that Steffan relates-and the kinds
of interactions that Thorne, Hillman and Anonymous Officer
Number One describe as taking place in the workplace, in
recreational spaces and during off-hours-combine to form a
pervasive, unstructured background again st which anything
other than an explicitly avowed heterosexu al identity would
stand out in sharp relief. Feminist theorist Monique Wittig has
observed tha t "to live in society is to live in h eterosexuality .... H eterosexuality is always already there within all mental categories."J 9 Whether gay and lesbian servicemembers
must affirm a heteros exual identity in words-as, frequently,
they must- or whether their enforced silence is loud enough to
claim the "default characterization" 40 of h et erosexual identity
that most conversations offer, the background of social relations in the military, as in most other contexts, is one of presumptive, compulsory heterosexuality.
The more structured activities of military existence are no
less rife with occasions in which servicemembers are forced to
make explicit, public affirmations of their sexual identities.
Formal social events constitute perhaps the most important
example of such a structured activity. Dances, balls and formal
dinners are a regular and central element of the social life of
every branch of the armed forces. Among officers, attendance
at such events is necessary in order to enjoy any hope of advancement within the ranks. Every individual interviewed for
this Article, without exception, made reference to this dynamic
and described the conflicts that formal social events create for
gay and lesbian servicemembers living inside the mandatory
closet of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. Anonymous Officer
Number One's account is typical.
The service tends to be a fairly tight-knit environment-you socialize with the people that you work with, especially when you're s tationed overseas. Every time there's a social event-a nd there tend to
be at leas t two form al events every year, along with lots of informal
get-togethers-there's interest on the part of yo ur fellow officers

Halley, supra note 5, at 934, 947 -48 & n.67.
39
MONIQUE WI'ITIG, THE STRAIGHT MIND 40 , 43 (1992); see also Michael
Warner, Introduction to FEAR OF A QUEER P LANET, at vii (Michael Warner ed.,
1993).
40
Janet E. Halley, Th e Construction of Heterosexuality , in F EAR OF A QUEER
PLAI'lET 82, 83 (Mich ael Warner ed. , 1993).
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about who you're going to bring. It's not nece ssarily prurient interest, it's just friendly a nd curious. They want to know whether h e's
going to be military or non-military; if he's military, a fighter pilot is
a lot better then a JAG lawyer; if he's not milita ry, is he a businessman or is h e a car mechanic? I t end to go stag, just to avoid a lot of
these proble ms . But of course, going s tag a ttract s attention, too.
When p eo ple ask, I tell them I choose to go st ag because, as I ge t
more s enior, the pool of available m en gets small er, a nd that I have
a blanket rule against dating men I work with. Th e other option is
to bring a safe date, but t hen people just continually ask you about
how things a re going with that guy th a t you brought to the da nce ,
so it do esn't really avo id the problem ..11

Tracy Thorne spoke in his interview of the consequences of not
making appearances at such events.
Formal events a re definitely a maj or part of a military career. If
yo u're n ot seen going out to the Office r's Club on a somewhat regular basis, if you're not a ttending the Intruder Ball, 42 if you're not
attending Dress Messes, eventu ally that's going to cut into you . You
have to be a "team pl ayer" in order to advance . A [gay] fri end of
mine who's in the Marine Corps knows a lesbian couple, and one of
them h as agreed to attend functions with him on a regular b asis,
just because you need that in order to advance. 43

Former Navy Lieutenant Paul Thomasson has similar
stories to relate . Thomasson, a highly decorated and widely
praised Naval officer, was separated and discharged after he
came out of the closet immediately following the effective date
of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. He challenged the constitutionality of the policy in federal court, ultimately losing his
case before the assembled judges of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 44 Thomasson now lives in Washington State and remains unabashedly angry at the treatment that he received,
both in federal court and in the press, following his separation

41

Anonymous Interview N umber One, supra note 35.
The Intrud er Ball was the premier social event at Virginia Beach, as Thorne
had explained earlier in his interview: "We had a huge banquet every year called
the 'Intrud er Ba ll ,' because the plane that we flew was called the A-6 Intruder. It
was th e biggest social event of the year-a must-attend." Thorne Inte rview , supra
note 32 .
43
Thorne Interview, supra note 32.
" See Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en bane), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 358 (1996).
42
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and discharge. That sentiment is apparent in his tone and demeanor as he recalls some of the details of formal social events
in the Navy.
There unquestionably is overt pressure to engage in unit functions. I
can remember one of my commanders demanding that I go to a
"dining out,"- one of the formal officers' dining occasions. As usual, I
didn't want to go because of the "date" problem, but with the commander demanding that I go, I couldn't just not show up. This particular time, though, I had another excuse I could use. Some of the
guys in the squadron had made a hoiTible international faux pas
recently-[behaved really badly on a trip to Japan) ... -so I told
my commander that I was disgusted at the ward room for their
behavior and I intended to boycott the event to upbraid the squadron. So that wasn't quite a lie, that time--I just made a much bigger
deal of this other incident than I ever would have otherwise. Of
course, my commander was very angry-when a commander says
you should go to a dining out and you refuse, you had better have a
good excuse. I was fortunate; had I performed less well at my job,
my refusal would have hurt me, and I was just fortunate that I was
a top performer. 45

Formal social events are perhaps the most visible among
those structured activities in the military that force
servicemembers to make statements about their sexual orientation, but they certainly are not the only such activities to
raise the issue. While Elizabeth Hillman has stories of her own
to relate concerning social events, 46 she provides an account of
another required activity in the military that involves somewhat less pageantry.
Women in the service have to go to a gynecologist and get a pap
smear done, at least once a year. One standard question that the
gynecologist has to ask is, ''What form of birth control are you currently using?" Obviously, you couldn't just say, "None"-I don't think
it was even an option on the form. For a straight woman, that would
be crazy. You had to make up a more believable response. You also
couldn't really claim to be using one of the safer methods of birth

45

Telephone Interview with Paul Thomasson, former Lieutenant, United States
Navy (Apr. 21, 1997) [hereinafter Thomasson Interview].
46
As Hillman said at onE; point:
Formal events-dances, or what have you-are a standard thing that
every unit has. Everyone goes, and everyone is expected to bring a date.
Every time it comes up, if you go without a date, or if you don't go at
all, people ask questions-it raises eyebrows. So some gay people bring
fake dates to quell suspicions.
Hillman Interview, supra note 34.
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control, [since those might; be relevant to health issues th at your
gynecologist would want to know about.] ... Personally, I would say
"abstinence" or "rhythm," as would some other lesbians I know, and
we would have to go t hrough s essions where the gynecoiogists would
explain how risky those methods were, ask us whether the problem
was that we fel t un co mfortable with condoms or the pill, and so
forth.~ '

Perhaps the greatest impact that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell
policy has is not to be found in structured activities or in casual social settings , but within the confines of gay
servicemembers' families and their close friendships with their
fellow soldiers . Because members of the armed forc es are considered to be on duty at all times, the policy forbids them from
ever speaking truthfully about their identities, even in private
moments. 48 While it 1s sometimes possible for gay

47
Hillm an Interview, supra note 34. S ee also SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEFENSE
NETWORK, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON "DON'T AsK, DON'T
TELL, DoN'T PURSUE," at 6 (1997) [hereinafter SLDN REPORT] ("The services
have reportedly instituted the disturbing practice of requiring h ealth care providers
in the military and those contracted to the military to turn in gay servicemembers
who seek their help in private counseling sessions.").
48
The Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy applies to servicemembers twenty-four hours
a day. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(9)-(10) (1997). This means that even a private acknowledgment by a gay servicemember of his sexual orientation, if discovered , can
trigger a separation proceeding under the policy. See, e.g., Th omasson, 80 F.3d at
932 ("[S]ervice members who have not publicly declared their homosexuality are
nevertheless s ubject to discharge if they have made private statements to that
effect, when those statements are brought to the attention of comm a nding officers
.. "). As Servicemembers Legal Defense Ne twork reports:
In their zealous pursuit of suspected gay military members Pentagon
officials have expand ed "Don't Tell" in ways that most Americans a re not
aware, to include private statements to family m embers, close fr iends,
doctors and psychologists. Servicemembers must k eep their sexu a l orientation a n absolute secret, hidd en even from their families, or risk investigation and disch arge.
SLDN REPORT, supra note 47, at 5-6.
In her recent Article, Professor Halley quotes from a m emorandum that the
Judge Advocate General's office h as distributed to Air Force investigato rs to guide
them in gathering information once they have begun a formal investigation.
Halley's research seems to corroborate SLDN's conclusions:
"If acts or other military members are discovered during the proper
course of [an] investigation, . . . appropriate action may be taken . . . .
Has the member told a ny of his family members? . . H as the member
been dating any body (o pposite or same sex)? How frequently has the
member dated? How recently? How can these peo ple be contacted? ...
Did the member belong to a ny homosexual student organizations at
school? If so, which? How can other members of the organization, who
knew of his membership , be contacted?"
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servicemembers to avoid formal or social situations where they
would otherwise be forced to put on a public appearance of heterosexuality, it is almost impossible to prevaricate in such a
manner with close, intimate friends-and, of course, it is all
the more painful to try. For some gay sen.ricemembers, this can
mean not forming close friendships at all , as Paul Thomasson
explains.
When you'r e not h avi ng to lie actively, you spend your time avoiding
the questions or changing the subject. The r es ult is that-OK, if I
look at gay people whom I know in the military , many of them are
the ov er- achi evers, the best and brightest, et cetera. A third to a
half of the J oint Chiefs of Staff interns wer e gay wh en I was there.
They got th ere because they had no life and poured all of their efforts into their jobs-to th e point of having to avoid making too close
a ttachments at work. You don't really get close to people when you
can't speak freely with them! 9

The experience of Anonymous Officer Number Two comports with Thomasson's observation. Anonymous Officer Number Two is a senior command officer and is still a member of
the armed forces. He asked that his precise rank and the
branch of the armed forces in which he serves not be revealed,
as that information might suffice to identify him and render
him vulnerable to reprisals. He is also the only gay
servicemember interviewed for this Article who unapologetically approves of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. His interview
thus provided a rare and valua ble perspective on the effects of
the policy. Anonymous Officer Number Two h as kept his personal life and his professional life in the armed forces completely separate, living in "many little rooms," as he puts it. 50
He has segregated the different parts of his life to such an
extent that, by his own account, he has formed no open and
lasting friendships with straight colleagues in the armed forces, despite a lifetime spent in military service.

H alley, supra no te 9, at 213 (quoting Department of the Air Force, Headquarters
USAF/JAG, memorandum for a ll Staff Judge Advoca tes and Military Judges, Re:
Commander Inquiries on Members Stating They are Homosexual, Nov. 3, 1993 ;
and id., a ttachment 2, "Sample Questions for Inquiry Con cernin g Member who
Sta tes H e is Homosexual After Receiving Advanced Education Benefits.").
49
Thomasso n Interview, supra note 45.
50
Interview with Ano nymous Officer Num ber Two, Senior Command Officer,
United States Military, at a n undisclosed location (July 19 , 1997) .
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I've alw ays been absolutely divorced, my sexual life from my professional life .. . . The greatest "sin" is the sin of omission sometimes,
so I just omit talking about my personal life to anyone in the military, in my professional life .51

Anonymous Officer Number Two, unlik e the other
servicemembers interviewed for this Article, has found this
social privation to be agreeable. 52
Most gay and lesbian servicemembers do form close fri endships, how ever, a nd those friendships can occasion some of the
greatest pain th a t the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy inflicts. As
discussed above, gay and lesbian servicememb ers often go to
great lengths to avoid social functions so as not to appear conspicuously single. Anonymous Officer Number One explains
that, while such strategies and "cover stories" may serve to
deflect casual inquiries, they do not help in her interactions
with close friends.
Th ere ar e fri ends m my life-men and women-who are simply
concern ed about me becaus e I am not dating somebody. Do I have
somebody to t ake care of me? Am I lonely? Is there someone in my
life to h elp me out? Th ese friends are just expressing their concern,
but I can't tell them the truth . I either t ell them that I'm not interested in dating right now-that I don't h ave time for a man in my
life, something like that-or else I invent a long-distance boyfriend.
When your fri ends are persistently concerned about you , you h ave to
t ell them something. 53

Michelle Benecke confirms that this experience is a com-

51

!d. In contrast, Anonymous Officer Number Two has fou nd opportunities to
develop friend ships-and more-with gay servicemembers. As h e explained: "I had
a lover who was my 'personal assistant' for eleven years and li ved with me in a
mili tary home. Nobody ever questioned it. His presence isn't even on my record.
My sexuality just h ad nothing to do with my career."
!d .
52
As he said at one point during our interview:
I'm not "gay," I'm homosexual, and there's a big differe nce . . . . If
you com e to my home, you'll see there's nothing a bout it that's "gay,"
and these "gay activists" that go around demanding "gay rights" really
disgust me . . . . I knew what I was getting into when I w ent in [to the
military]. I did n't join the [armed forces] to get a date. . . I'll retire
with a pension of $ 120,000- you t ell me what the payoff is . Do I fee l
d eprived? No . . . . Would I do it all over again? Absolutely , and I wouldn't do anything differently.
!d.
53
Anonymous Interview Number One, supra n ote 35.
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mon one. Benecke served in the Army for six years, leaving the
service in 1989 with the rank of Captain. She is now the Executive Director of Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, the
organization that serves as the primary resource in the United
States for gay and lesbian servicemembers, offering both counseling and legal advice. Benecke reports that almost every
client she sees comes to her organization after the policy has
provoked an unbearable ethical dilemma. In the majority of
cases, this ethical dilemma grows out of a forced separation
from close friends or family. In fact, in Benecke's experience,
the problem is most acute during one of the times when family
and friends are most important: the holiday season.
[W]hen people are deployed, gay people can't even be honest in any
communication with anyone at hom e, unlike heterosexual soldiers,
because everyone's mail is censored and their t elephone calls are
monitored. These people are not able to be out to their families because of DADT; they can't be out with their loved ones because of
DADT; and they h ave to face the prospect of losing their lives in
service of their country. Right around the holidays , when people are
just coming back, we get a big spate of calls from people trying-to
figure out what to do. 54

Sometimes, gay and lesbian servicemembers find the prospect of lying to their close friends too painful to bear. They
resolve to tell the truth, despite the enormous risk to their
careers, their futures, and their safety. Elizabeth Hillman
recalls the time that she was faced with this difficult choice.
I had a close friend-[l et's call him "Rick"]-who worked in the same
office I did at Colorado Springs. [Rick] came into work one day with
a sort of far-off look on his face and asked me, completely out of the
blue, "Beth, when was the last time you were in love-! mean, really, head-over-heels in love?" It was a totally innocent, friendly question-he might even have meant it to be a little flirtatious. I
blanched, had no id ea what to say in response. The truth was that I
had recently met [the woman with whom I'm now sharing my life]
and fallen head-over-heels in love with her, but I wasn't allowed to
tell him that. I m anaged to stutter some noncommittal answer and
change the subject, but I felt extremely uncomfortable with that response. [Rick] was a friend, and I didn't like lying to him, for any
reason. It finally led me to come out of the closet to him a few days
later. I sat down with him to have a talk about our earlier conversation, and I told him , "I didn't quite know what to say, because I'm in

54

Benecke Interview, supra note 38. See also Faje r, supra note 38, at 597.
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love right now, but it's not with a man." 55

What price do es the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy exact from
gay and lesbian servicemembers when it forc es them to choose
between t elling lies about themselves and risking the sacrifice
of their careers and their safety? The answer must n ecessarily
be differen t for every individual. Even so, it would not be overstating the case to say that it is the r are gay or lesbian soldier
for whom that toll is not a heavy one. Anger, quiet r ese ntment,
and sincere r egret over the false identities they have been
forced to ado pt were common among the servicemembers who
agreed to be interviewed for this Article. The armed forces are
organized around an ethic of honor and respect. Being compelled to lie about the most personal aspects of one's life to the
friends and associates who are supposed to be one's closest
allies in guarding that ethic cannot help but do damage to a
servicemember's spirit and her sense of self_5 6 Perha ps nothing could provide a more appropriate illustration of this price
than the words of a servicemember who is still living under the
onus of that compelled dishonesty on a daily basis. Anonymous
Officer Number One tells the following story of her life under
the policy.
The job that I'm in now is one that's designated "high security." As
part of my intervi ew for my security clearance, I was asked to rate
myself as to how honest of a person I am, on a scale from one to ten.
My first reaction was, well, I don't believe in absolutes , but I think

55

Hillman Interview, sup ra note 34.
Indeed, P rofessor Halley invites us to reflect seriously upon the extent to
which our cr eation of a pu blic identity can become cons ti t utive of the entirety of
our social existe nce. She argues that we do not merely become less h onest wh en
we must lie about who we are-we become less ourselves, in social as well as legal
intercourse.
[H]omosexuals who experience their sexual desire as immutably orien ted towards persons of their own sex nevertheless may be coerced to pretend that
they conform to the norm of heterosexuality. Such a result is no mere fib: it
is a change. To be sure, what has changed is not the suppo3ed essence of
· sexua l orientation , but the representation of it available for social interpretation. But essences, conceding for a moment their existence, are not visible to
legislatures, jud ges, employer s, or police. Socia l agents work with social meaning; the fairness and ind eed the constitutionality of their acts must be m eas ured in the context of the practical, not the ideal, epis temology of their
decisionmaking.
H a lley, supra note 5, at 934 (cita tion omitted). See also Fajer, supra note 38, at
596-97 (discussing im pact of dishonesty and prevarication upon closeted gay men
and lesbians).
56
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I'm a very honest person ; so I rated myself a nine. But then, as I
was wallting out of my interview , I thought, how could I possibly
have r ated myself a nine, this whole thing is a lie. I normally am
such an honest person, but the military requires me to lie about this
one part of my life that's so important. [She pauses.] I got my security cleara nce. 57

Stories like thes e might properly shape one's assessment
of the wisdom of Don't Ask, Don't Tell as a matter of policy,
but it is not for that purpose that they are recounted here.
They are recounted because understan ding these stories is a
prerequisite to producing a meaningful constitutional analysis
of the policy, whatever the ultimate conclusion of that analysis
might be . It is not simply the case that the interest of gay and
lesbian servicemembers in not being compelled to make false
affirmations of their identity has been undervalued in judicial
review of the policy; it has been entirely overlooked. These
stories provide the tools with which to begin the necessary,
formal inquiry into the legal significance of that interest.

II. SILENCE

AS SPEECH

A . The Value of Silence

The expressive power of the silence of gay and lesbian
servicemembers is central to the operation of the Don't Ask,
Don't Tell policy. To understand why this is so, it is necessary
to understand the nature of the value structure that the
military's policy was designed to defend. In his classic essay,
Nomos and Narratiue,58 Robert Cover h as offered a frame-

57

Anonymo us Intervi ew Number One , supra note 35. A:. Professor Halley has
suggested, such deception can threaten more than a gay person's honesty and
integrity; it can threaten h er very sense of self. Halley describes the effects of a
policy requiring mandatory dismissal of C. I. A. age nts who a dmit to being gay, and
the D.C. Circuit opinion (affirmed by the S upreme Court) that upheld it:
[The opinion] opens a pocket of legal protection fo r individuals who obey
a prohibition on homosexuality not by eschewing homosexual acts or
rejecting a homosexual subjective identity, but by ap pearing straight. One
cost to them of accepting that protection is that they must also accept
the public meaning of their equivocal position- the court's equation of
their closetedness with the assumption t hat they have internalized the
substantive determin ation that homosexuality is degrading to them.
H a lley, supra note 5, at 958.
58
See Robert M. Cover, The Suprem e Cou rt, 1982 Term: Forward: Nomos and
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work within which to describe the norms and value structures
of a community. Cover's approach looks to the depth of the
commitment that a community demonstrates in defending a
particular set of values or a particular, narrow definition of
membership . As one paradigm, Cover identifies communities
that embrace a diversity of individuals and institutions among
their members and are structured around the enforcement of
rule-based norms, exhibiting only a shallow, thin commitment
to any particular moral or ethical precepts . He describes such
groups as "imperial" in nature and offers the State-and, more
broadly, legal communities-as the most visible examples. 59
In contrast, Cover des cribes what he calls the "paideic" community: a group that is characterized by a deeper form of commitment, one whose reason for existing centers around a particular conception of the good, a deeply held value structure, or
a nonpluralistic definition of membership. 6° Cover suggests
that paideic communities-which might include groups defined
by their religious, cultural, or ethnic affiliations-are the most
important sites for the creation of cultural meaning. As he
puts it, such communities constitute the source of those "narratives that imbue [the legal] precepts [of modern, "imperial"
nation-states] with rich significance."61
The institution of the military challenges the fixity of the
distinction between the imperial and the paideic-and, concomitantly, the fixity of the distinction between pluralistic State
institutions, on the one hand, and communities with deeplyheld commitments to particular cultural values, on the other. 62 In form, the .A..merican military is, fundamentally, a
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
59
Cover writes:
In [the "imperial"] mod el, norms are universal and enforced by institutions. They need not be taught at all, as long as they are effective . Discourse is premised on objectivity-upon that which is external to the
discourse itself. Interpersonal commitments are weak, premised only upon
a minimalist obligation to refrain from the coercion and violence that
would make impossible the objective mode of discourse and the impartial
and neutral ap plication of norms .
!d. at 13.
60
AB Cover puts it: "[T]he term ['paideic'] suggests: (1) a common body of precept and narrative, (2) a common and personal way of being educated into this
corpus, and (3) a sense of direction or growth that is constituted as the individual
a nd his community work out the implications of their law. " !d . at 12-13.
61
!d. at 16.
62
Cover recognizes that, in practice, these categories ordinarily are not realized
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pluralistic institution . Unlike the armies of nobility in medieval Europe , where the honor of professional military service
was reserved for the wealthy and the powerful, 63 the U.S. military embraces the principle that underlies most public institutions in America: Applicants are to be judged on their qualifications alone, and all those who are qualifi ed are at least eligible to participate. 64 To be sure, the qualifi cations and requirements of service in the military interfere with servicemembers'
deeply-held personal commitments, more so than do the requirements of any other public institution in America. The Supreme Court has observed that the armed forces constitute "a
specialized society" 65 that requires "instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps" 66 in aid of effective military service, even though these values sometimes require
servicemembers to accept compromises in their ability to demonstrate their commitment to their paideic communities . It is
for this reason that the Court accords great deference to the
military whenever individuals bring claims under the First

in "pure" form ; he states : "Of course, no normative world has ever been created or
maintained wholly in either the paideic or the imperia l mode . I am not writing of
types of societies, but rather isolating in discourse the coexisting bases for the
distinct attributes of all normative worlds. " Id. at 14. Indeed, Cover goes on to
acknowledge the danger that the State poses when it embraces "paideic" commitments, and he praises West Virginia u. Barnette a nd other cases for the
protections they provid e from that dan ger . S ee id. a t 61 (" Certain decisions have
a cknowledged the dan gerous tendencies of a s tatist pa id ei a and m arked its boundaries through formal sp ecifica tion of the limits of public me aning." ).
63
See, e.g., F.L. GANSHOF, FEUDALISM 16- 19 (1952 ).
6
'
In the F ederal Constitution, this foundational no rm finds expression in the
Equal Protection Clause a nd in the a bolition of Titles of Nobility and Bills of
Attainder. S ee U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l ("No S ta te shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); id. a rt. I, § 9, cl.
8 ("No Title of Nobility sha ll be granted by the United States."); id. a rt. I, § 9, cl.
3 ("No Bill of Attainder ... shall be passed."). The id eal of equality of opportunity for qualified applicants has consistently shaped the S upreme Court's jurisprudence of individual rights. In Regents of the Uni versity of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (197 8) (opinion of Powell, J.), for example, th e Court s truck down a California affirmative action program on the grounds tha t t he program left no opportunity for white applicants to compete for certain admiss ion seats, regardless of how
the qualificati ons for those a dmission seats were defined. "No matter how strong
their qualifica tions, quantita tive and ext ra curricular, incl uding their own potential
for contribution to educational diversity," the Court explained , white applicants
"are never a fforded the ch a nce to compete with applica nts from the preferred
groups for th e special admission seats." Id. at 319.
65
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974).
66
Goldm a n v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986).
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Amendment, the Constitution's primary source of protection to
paideic communities. 67 Even so, the military ordinarily administers even its most invasive restrictions in what Cover would
call a "statist" or "imperialist" manner: It requires that all
servicemembers satisfy the same neutral standards of ability,
appearance, obedience and respect. In according deference to
the military in its Speech and Religion Clause analysis, the
Court has taken pains to reiterate that the First Amendment
still applies to limit the actions of the military, 68 and it has
consistently demanded even-handedness in the definition a n d
administration of military regulations. 5 9
In substance, however, the American military has exhibited a deep and consistent commitment to a norm that runs
counter to the otherwise pluralistic tenor of its criteria for
admission and service. The military is the primary site for the
definition of manhood in American culture, and military service is the most important opportunity for citizens to attain to
that virtue. Professor Kenneth Karst has written about the

67

The First Amendment, of course, guards the expressive, religious and
associational interests of the citizenry. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."); see also Cover, supra note 58, at 26-33, 60-67 (discussing importance
of First Amendment protection of speech, association and religion to existence of
paideic communities).
68
See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) ("[M]embers of the military
services are entitled to the protections of the First Amendment . . . . "); see also
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U .S. 503, 507 (1986) ("[The special] aspects of military life do not, of course, render entirely nugatory in the military context the
guarantees of the First Amendment."); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974)
("[T]he members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by
the First Amendment."); cf. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) ("[O]ur
citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have
doffed their civilian clothes.") (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the
Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188 (1962)).
69
See, e.g., Brown, 444 U.S. at 358 n.15 (upholding regulation requiring official
approval of petitions circulated on Air Force bases, but explaining: "Commanders
sometimes may apply [such regulations] irrationally, invidiously, or arbitrarily,
thus giving rise to legitimate claims under the First Amendment.") (internal quotation omitted); Greer v. Spack, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (requiring that regulations
restricting political demonstrations on military property be "objectively and
evenhandedly applied"); Goldman, 475 U.S. at 513 (Stevens, J., concurring) (providing fifth vote to uphold application of Air Force D.ress code to yarmulke worn by
observant Jew because "the rule that is challenged in this case is based on a
neutral, completely objective standard-visibility").
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American military's commitment, throughout its history, to the
specification and enforcement ofthe qualiti es that are constitutive of manhood .70 Those qualities, he points out, have b een
far from plurali stic. The military's definition of m asculine virtue-a definition that has played a unique rol e in setting standards for citizenship status in America 71 -has repeatedly
found expression in discrimina tory restrictions on the qualifications for military service. Indeed, Karst argu es th a t this
institutional "purs uit of manhood" has bee n the primary cultural motivation for most of the major insta nces of discrimination in mili tary personnel policies. During the period when
African-American men were still openly dismi ssed in American
popular culture as unacceptable exemplars of masculine virtue,
the military defended that racist construction of manhood, first
by excluding blacks from military service altogether, then by
segregating them into second-class units. 72 Similarly, Karst
argues, the exclusion and segregation of women has been the
result of the military's commitment to a vision of masculine
virtue that excludes women from its core . For many years,
women were entirely barred from military service. Eventually,
the claims of women to equal citizenship status gained sufficient force that the military, in its capacity as a pluralistic
institution, felt compelled to make an accommodation and
admit them among its ranks. Nonetheless, women continue to
be largely excluded from active combat, the aspect of military

70

See Kenneth L. Karst, Th e Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the
Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. RE V. 499, 500 (1991 ). For a further exploration of the
importance of military service to defining the virtu e of manhood, see, for example,
RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: LESBIANS

& GAYS IN THE U. S . MILITARY,

VIETNAlvl TO TH E PERSIAN GULF 28-36 (1993).
71
See Karst, sup ra note 70, a t 502-03, 505-06. Professor Leisa Meyer characteri zes the importance of military service to the definition of the ri ghts of citizens
in the following terms:
[B)eca use the military is a critical bas tion of state power and service
within it a determinant of the ri ghts of citizens, a llowing hete rosexual
women , lesbians, a nd gay men to participate within it fu lly and w ithout
harassment or discrimination increases expectations that those same
groups will be treated with fairness and respect in t he public sector.
LEISA D. MEYER, C REATIN G G.I. JANE: SEXUALITY AND POWER IN THE WOMEN'S

AR;vrY CORPS D UR ING WORLD WAR II , at 1 (1996).
72
See Karst, supra note 70, a t 510-22.
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service that serves as the primary site for the definition of
manhood, permitting the military to maintain its commitment
to traditional masculine virtues. 73
Karst concludes that the policy that excluded all gay men
and lesbians from military service sprang from the same
source. The military has defended a conception of manhood
that defines gay men as lesser, degenerate versions of their
heterosexual peers and defines lesbians as aber.Lant, ambiguous transgressors of essential gender boundaries. 74 Such a
vision of manhood depends upon the categorical exclusion of
gay identity. 75 The acknowledged and open presence of gays
and lesbians in military service would threaten that vision.
Therefore, heterosexuality became a necessary qualification for
military service. As Karst explains:
For those who want to keep the public's gaze fixed on "the manliness of war," the tensions of male bonding demand a clear expression of the services' rejection of homosexuality. This expression is
not just a by-product of the policy that purports to exclude gay men
and lesbians from the armed forces; it is the policy's main function.
When a gay soldier comes to the Army's official attention, the real
threat is not the hindrance of day-to-day operations, but rather the
tarnishing of the Army's traditionally masculine image. 76

Under the blanket exclusion of gay men and lesbians that was
the subject of Karst's investigation, the policy's defense of masculinity was straightforward and unmediated. The explicit
requirement of heterosexuality as a qualification for service
operated to secure the traditional definition of manhood to

73

See Karst, supra note 70, at 523-45. Professor Meyer provides a description
of the military at around the time that women were first admitted:
[T]he ideological construction of "soldier" as a man with a weapon
who fights, and the military as a preeminently masculine institution,
continued [when women were first admitted to the armed forces] to include all white men, whether or not they saw combat, and black men
who were active combatants, while excluding all women entirely.
MEYER, supra note 71, at 12-13; see also MEYER, supra note 71, at 11-32.
74
See Karst, supra note 70, at 546-47; see also ALLAN BERUBE, THE HISTORY
OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR II at 13-14 (1991).
75
As Professor Cover writes: "The radical instability of the paideic nomos forces intentional communities-communities whose members believe themselves to
have common meanings for the normative dimensions of their common lives - to
maintain their coherence as paideic entities by expulsion and exile of the potent
flowers of normative meaning." Cover, supra note 58, at 15-16.
76
Karst, supra note 70, at 545-46.
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which the military was committed. It did so, however, at the
expense of the pluralistic values that the military, as a State
institution, has an obligation to promote.
The current policy originated as an accommodation to
those pluralistic values. In 1993, Navy Lieutenant Keith
Meinhold challenged the military's blanket exclusion of gay
m en and lesbians in a federal di stri ct court in California. The
di strict court struck down the policy on equal protection
grounds, reinstated Meinhold, and issued a nationwide injuncti on to prevent the military from disch arging any other gay
servicemembers. 77 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
qu ashed the injunction and affirmed Meinhold's reinstatement
on much narrower grounds. The circuit court construed the
policy to require a conduct violation in order to support a discharge, avoiding an interpretation that would have authorized
discharges on the basis of status alone. 78 The court went on to
suggest that a policy banning gay people from service solely on .
the basis of their sexual orientation would present serious
constitutional problems. 79
In response, the military sought to craft a policy that
would satisfy its obligations as a pluralistic institution while
still allowing it to continue to defend a heterosexual vision of
manhood. What resulted was Don't Ask, Don't Tell, permitting
gay people to serve but forcing them to do so in silence. Under
the new policy, the military is able to defend its commitment
to heterosexual manhood precisely because it can rely upon
society's general presumption of heterosexuality to transform a
gay servicemember's silence into an affirmation of heterosexual
identity. The expressive power of silence in matters of sexual
identity thus permits the military to maintain its paradoxical
role as both an imperial public institution with pluralistic
standards of admission and a paideic community that creates
and defends a purely heterosexual vision of masculine virtue.

77

See Meinhold v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455, 1457-58 (C.D.
Cal. 1993), affd on different grounds, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994).
78
See Meinhold v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 34 F. 3d 1469, 1478-80 (9th Cir.
1994).
79
S ee id . a t 1476-77.
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By compelling gay servicemembers to remain silent about their
true identities, the policy requires them to embrace and affirm
that vision. This is the intended mode of the policy's operation. 80
In calling for a recognition of the affirmative role that
silence plays in maintaining the value structure that underlies
the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy, this Article embraces a project
similar to the one that Professor Jed Rubenfeld has advanced
in calling for a reconceptualization of the right to privacy. 81
Rubenfeld has argued that "the fundamental right to privacy is
not to be found in the supposed fundam entality of what the
law proscribes. It is to be found in what the law imposes ."82
Proscriptive mod els of the right to privacy, he explains, ultimately rest upon some theory of "personhood"-that is, an
account of which activities are "fundamental" to our concept of
personhood and, for that reason, should not ordinarily be subject to regulation by the State. 83 Rubenfeld convincingly argues that such theories suffer from severe problems of definition and administration, inevitably producing intractable disputes over, for example, what parts of our identities are "fundamental,"84 or how an "identity" (or an identifying trait) is to

8
° Compare Professor Halley's description of the holding of the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals in Doe u. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affd in part,
reu'd in part on the other grounds, sub. nom. Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047
(1987) in Halley, supra. note 5, at 956-58. In Casey , the D.C. Circuit denied relief
to a gay agen t of the C. I.A. who claimed that the age ncy's policy of denying security clearance (a nd emp loyment) to gay peop le denied him due process of law. In
rejecting the agent's claim that the policy placed an impermissible stigma upon
him, Halley observes, the court gave a r eading to the policy that purported to
demonstrate greater fidelity to the impera tives of fairness and due process but
that actua lly operated to define the agent's interests out of existence:
The court purports to view the problem of stigm a from Doe's point of
view: if he disclosed his homosexuality, he clearly sees nothing scandalous in it; and if h e sees nothing scandalous in his homosexuality, he has
no liberty interest in evading its lega l consequences . The apparent respect paid h ere to Doe's sel f-conception and self-description is revealed as
a sham if we note the implication of the court's reasoning: a self-identified homosexual in government employment, in order to retain a liberty
interest in his or her job, must (1) subjectively regard his or her homosexuality as degrading and (2) hid e it.
H a lley, supra note 5, a t 957.
81
See Jed Rubenfeld , The Right of Priuacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737 (1989).
82
!d. at 739.
83
See id. at 738-39.
84
See id. at 754-70.
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be defined and limited .85 As an alternative, Rubenfeld urges
us to examine the affirmative impact that a regulation has
upon its target when it affirmatively takes over their lives,
forcing them into certain narrow channels. For example, where
a woman's right to have an abortion is concerned, Rubenfeld
argues that "[w]omen should be able to abort their pregnancies
so that they may avoid being forced into an identity"-that of
motherhood-"not because they are defining their identiti es
through the decision itself." 86 It is those laws that "tend to
take over the lives of the persons involved"87- to "occupy and
preoccupy"88-that should require extraordinary justification
from the Sta te and provoke searching judicial scrutiny . Thus,
Rubenfeld argu es, to determine whether a law impermissibly
infringes upon an individual's right of privacy, we should ask
whether it "affirmatively and very substantially shape[s that]
person's life."89
This Article meets Rubenfeld's challenge on different, but
related, doctrinal ground . It identifies the silence that the
Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy imposes upon gay servicemembers
as an attempt not merely to proscribe the expression of gay
identity in the military-Professor Karst's central insight90-but to require the affirmative expression of heterosexual identity by gay and straight servicemembers alike. 91
Under the terms of the policy, gay servicemembers are forced
to participate in the project of defining and reaffirming a value
structure that excludes them entirely from its core. Rubenfeld

85

See id. a t 770-82.
Rubenfeld , supra note 81 , a t 782
87
Rubenfeld, supra note 81, a t 784 .
88
Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 784.
89
Rubenfeld, supra note 81 , at 784.
90
See Karst, supra note 70 , at 545-46.
91
Thus, in a rguing th at Bowers u. Hardwick, 47 8 U.S. 186 (1986), was wrongly
decid ed, Rubenfeld writes:
We tend , in meas uring [the] morality [of laws prohibiting homosexual
cond uct], to form a n image of either the ho mosexual imprisoned or the
homosexual forced to give up his sexu al acts . We ought, however, to give
up the image of "the homosexual" in the first place and measure the law
instead in terms of its creation of heterosexu a ls (a nd , in a different way,
of hom osexuals too) within the standardized parameters of a state-regula ted identity.
Ru benfe ld , supra note 81, a t 801. See also Thomas, supra note 8, at 1497-98 (discussing Rubenfeld 's treatment of Bowers)
86
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properly instructs us to ask what affirmative acts of speech the
forced silence of the policy imposes, and not merely what acts
of speech it proscribes. 92
92

See Rubenfeld , supra note 8 1, at 739. Having embra ced the large-scale dimensions of Rubenfeld 's proj ect, I must regi s ter my dissa tisfaction with his own
a pplication of his thes is to anti-gay regulations . Whi le his analysis contains hi nts
of a sophisticated und ers ta nding of the economy of public sexual id entities in
which closeted gay people must trade, Ruben fe ld non etheless seems to have an
und erstanding of the impac t gay people feel from r estrictions on sexual intimacy
that is at once overbroad and under-inclusive. He writ es:
[T]he prohibition against homosexual sex channe ls individuals' sexua l
desires into reproductive outlets. .
The proscription is against homosexual sex; the products are lives forced into rel a tions with the opposite
sex that substanti a lly direct individuals' roles in society and a large part
of their everyday existence . . . . [T]he real force of anti-homosexua l laws ,
if obeyed, is that they enlist and redirect physical and emotional desires
that we do not expect people to suppress.
Rubenfeld, supra note 81 , at 800. This analysis is overbroad in the insula rity tha t
it ascribes to the lives of gay men and women. It s eems to assume that a gay
person's natural state of being is one in which "relations with the opposite sex"
are not "a large part of [one's] everyday existence ." Rubenfeld, supra note 81, a t
800. Unless Rubenfeld means to use "relations" narrowly as a euphemism for
sex-which, clearly, h e does not, see Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 799-801-then
h e has a vision of h ow gay people lead their lives that is, to say the least, contestable. See Thomas, supra note 8, at 1506-07 (criticizing Rubenfeld for simplistic
understanding of life-choices of gay m en and lesbians).
More importantly, Rubenfeld's analysis is under-inclus ive in that it steadfastly
refuses to allow the invasion into a gay person's intimate life that res ults from
restrictions on adult, consensual sexual behavior to enter into its calculus. Under
Rub enfeld's approach , such an invasion is prohibited , if at a ll, only by virtue of its
fortuitous congru ence \vith the institution-channeling aspects of the r estrictiv e
statute. This seems, fundam entally, to miss the point. In making this observation
(with its invocation of the "fundamental"), I deliberately invite the rejoind er th a t
my criticism is simply a gesture toward the "personhood" model of privacy analysis
that Rubenfeld h as so coge ntly criticized. Nonetheless, insofar as Rubenfeld rests
his theory of privacy entirely on the capacity of a law to force an individua l's li fe
into certain institutional channels , it is sim ply incomplete. For exaillple, Rubenfeld
praises Griswold u. Con necticut , 38 1 U.S. 479 (1965)-in which the Court held the
use of contraceptives by a married couple to merit protection under a right of
privacy-as a vindication of his own privacy theory. As in the case of abortion, he
explains, a contrary res ult would have meant forcing women to devote their lives
to motherhood . See Rubenfeld , sup ra note 81, at 791. But does this suggest that,
where abortion is freely available to women, the use of contraception should no
longer receive privacy protection? Rubenfeld's own discussion of Griswold hints at
this result. See Rub enfe ld, supra note 81, at 791 ("At least at the time [Grisw old]
was decided, when abo rtion was still generally prohibited, the ban on contraception
was equivalent in its positive as pect to enforced child-bearing."). But to suggest
that the use of contr aceptives is no longer a vital privacy right because women
can just go out and get abortio ns shou ld make us reco il. And why? Because the
decision whether to continue or terminate a pregnancy is so personal and intim ate
that it wo uld be unacceptable to predicate a policy (or a constitutional analysis) on

1176

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63: 1141

B. Silence as Speech
The maxim that silence can constitute speech is one that
pervades the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence-both in its Free Speech and Establishment Clause
cases. In analyzing the Court's treatment of this dynamic, it is
necessary at the outset to distinguish between two different
issues that the Court has considered regarding silence. These
might best be described as the issue of silence as a speech
interest, on the one hand, and silence as speech, on the other.
The distinction, in other words, is one between situations
where a claimant asserts an interest in remaining silent and
thereby not speaking, and situations where a claimant asserts
that his silence effectively constitutes speech. It is the latter
dynamic that drives the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. H owever,
the former situation is also important to the present inquiry.
The right not to speak is related to the jurisprudence of compelled affirmations embodied in West Virginia v. Barnette and
its progeny, 93 and the Court has recognized that right as one
that enjoys dignity and force equal to that of the right to engage in affirmative expressive acts. In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, 94 for example-a case
involving a state requirement that charities communicate certain information when making their requests for donations-Justice Brennan pronounced the frequently quoted
maxim that "the First Amendment guarantees 'freedom of
speech,' a term necessarily comprising the decision of both
what to say and what not to say." 95 How this treatment of
silence as a speech interest fits in to the present inquiry will
be taken up later in the discussion of Barnette. 96

an easy willingness to force women regularly to resort to abortion as a contraceptive method. Rubenfeld's theory of privacy offers no answer to this problem.
93
See Hunter, supra note 6, at 1719.
94
487 U.S. 781 (1988) (Brennan, J.).
95
Id. at 796-97. See also Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
256 (1974) (striking down Florida statute requiring newspaper to provide space for
response by those they editorially criticize and holding that "(t]he Florida statute
operates as a command in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding
appellant to publish specified matter").
96
See infra Part IV.
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One of the paradigmatic analyses of communication by
silence involves the possibility of attribution or endorsement.
When two potential speakers enjoy a r elationship with eachother that could lead an uninformed observer to assume that
the two are voluntarily affiliated-even if that relationship is
only an incidental or a spatial one-then the observer might
also attribute the remarks of one speaker to the other in the
absence of an express disclaimer. Where such a disclaimer is
impractical or impossible, there may be a danger that one
speaker will be forced to endorse, by h er silence, the message
of the other.
The capacity of silence to constitute a n affirmation in this
manner finds its clearest illustration in the Establishment
Clause context, in the case of L ee v. Weisman. 97 In Weisman,
a young student successfully challenged the constitutionality of
a public school's decision to include a religious invocation as
part of the commencement ceremonies that it conducted during
graduation. The school system of Providence, Rhode Island had
made a practice of inviting local members of the clergy to deliver prayers to its graduating middle and high school students. Students were admonished to stand and maintain a
respectful silence while the clergyman delivered his invocation.
Deborah Weisman, a student at a middle school in Providence,
claimed that the practice violated the Establishment Clause in
two respects. First, she maintained that the State's involvement with religion in the commencement ceremonies, which
included a measure of editorial control over the invocation, was
so pervasive as to create a "state-sponsored and state-directed
religious exercise" and thus to constitute an impermissible governmental endorsement of religion. 98 Second, Weisman argued
that the nature of the ceremony was such that she was effectively forced to endorse and participate in the prayer through
her silence, and that such forced participation in a religious
exercise was antithetical to the requirements of the Establishment Clause. 99 The majority in Weisman accepted both of

97
98
99

505 U .S. 577 (1992).
Id. at 587.
ld. at 59 3-94.
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these arguments in awarding Deborah Weisman her victory. It
is the second argument that is of particular importance for
present purposes. 100
Lee u. Weisman is remarkable for its candid and explicit
reliance on the operation of subtle cultural forces-social conventions-in recognizing the burden that the State-sponsored
invocation in that case placed on the students' right of religious freedom. If the students in Providence had actually been
coerced into making a plain statement of their endorsement of,
and participation in , the religious invoca tion, such coercion
would clearly have violated th e Establishment Clause. The
Court's ruling rested on its recognition that silence can sometimes have the same meaning and effect as a plain sta tement
of this type. The majority observed that "in our culture standing or remaining silent can signify adherence to a view or
simple respect for the views of others. " 101 Here, the Court
found that the State forced the students to convey a message
of participation and endorsement merely by pressuring them to
remain silent. That message, though perhaps not without ambiguity, was nonetheless sufficiently intelligible to render the
ceremony and invocation constitutionally infirm. The Court
explained:
There can be no doubt that for many, if not most, of the students at
the graduation, the act of standing or remaining silent was an expression of participation in the rabbi's prayer. Tha t was the very
point of the religious exercise. It is of little comfort to the dissenter,
then, to be told that for her the act of standing or r emaining in

100

Les t there be any ambiguity on the point, I do not mean to suggest tha t the
actual holding in Lee u. Weisman is applicable to the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy.
The Establishment Clause raises unique constitutional concerns, for it prohibits the
government from engaging in an entire category of expression (religious speech)-a
proscription that runs directly contrary to the norms embodied in the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause. As the Court observed in Weisman:
Speech is protected by ensuring its full expression even when the government participates, for the very object of some of our most important
speech is to persuade the government to adopt an idea as its own . . .
The Free Exercise Clause em braces a freedom of conscience and wors hip
that has close parallels in the speech provisions of the First Amendment,
but the Establishment Clause is a specific prohibition on form s of state
intervention in religious affa irs with no precise counterpar t in the speech
provisions.
Id. at 591. Lee u. Weisman is offered here, instead, for its clear recognition of the
capacity of silence to constitute an affirmative act of speech .
101
Id. at 593 .
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silence signifi es mere respect, rath er than participation. What ma tters is that, given our social co nventions, a reasonable diss enter in
this milieu could believe th at the gro up exerci se signified h er own
participa tion or approval of it. 102

It is important to note that the perception with which the
Court is concerned here is that of th e dis senter h er self, whose
silence m ay crea te in her "a reasonable perception tha t she is
being forced by the State to pray in a m anner her consci ence
will not allow." 103 If a student's enforced silence in a ceremony like the one reviewed in Weisman can create t he perception
in the student's own mind that she has endorsed and participated in a religious observance that violates her beliefs, then
such enforced silence can certainly create that impression in
the minds of others who observe her. 104
In its Speech Clause analysis, the Court has likewise taken cognizance of the potential for messages to be attributed
among speakers in this fashion . The case of Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston 105 pro-

102

Lee, 505 U .S. at 593. See also id. a t 592 ("What to most believers may seem
nothing more than a reasonable r eq uest that the nonbeliever respect [others'] religious practices, in a school context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to
be an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy.").
103
!d . at 593.
10
' Thus far, com me ntators seem large ly to have over looked the importance of
Lee u. Weisman for its contribution to the analysis of expressi ve silences. Rather,
most commen tators h ave focused on the question of wh ether Weisman can be read
finally to hav e rejected the three-pronged test of Lemon u. Ku rtzm an in Establishment Clause analysis. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux,
1992 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 131 (arguing that Lee u. Weisman effectively rejected
Lemon test); Charles Fried, Forward: Reuolutions2, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 68 n.374
(1995) (" It wo uld seem that the clarion calls for the abando nm ent of Lemon have
finally been heard. ") (citin g Lee u. Weisman; Sherry, supra) . At least one commentator has discussed Weism an's implicatio ns for the expressive power of si lence,
albeit in a field very different from th at of the present inquiry. In his Article,
Reading Casey: Str ucturing the Woman's Decisionmaking Process, 4 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 787 (1996), Rob ert Goldstein invokes Weisman's trea tment of wh at he
calls the "captive audience" problem in analyzing the speech interests of doctors
who are subj ect to restrictions on disseminating abortion information. See id. at
847-48 & n .185. Goldstein then goes on to tie this problem of the "captive a udience" to the First Ame ndm ent's injunction against compelled affirmations, whether
effectuated by compelled speech or by enforced s ilence. See id . at 853 ("[W]hen
[an] indiv idu a l assumes a professional or other work rol e, [Planned Parenthood u.
]Casey suggests that reasonable regulation may diminish or elimin ate this right
not to be requ ired to endorse-by words or silence- prescribed speech .").
105
115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
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vides a ready example. The controversy in Hurley centered
around the participation of gay and lesbian marchers in the
Saint Patrick's Day Parade in Boston. In 1993, members of
GLIB, 106 a support and advocacy group for gay, lesbian an d
bisexual descendants of Irish immigrants, requested that the
group be allowed to march under its own banner at the parade.
The parade's private organizers, the South Boston Allied War
Veterans Council, denied the group's request. In response,
GLIB invoked a Massachusetts public accommodations law and
obtained a state court injunction requiring the parade organizers to allow its members to march. 107 The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts affirmed the trial court's ruling, but
the U.S. Supreme Court, led by Justice Souter, unanimously
quashed the injunction. The Court found, first, that "[p]arades
are ... a form of expression, not just motion," 108 and, second,
that forcing the parade organizers to admit an openly gay
contingent would alter the message that the organizers intended to communicate. As the Court put it:
[A] contingent marching behind [GLIB's] banner would at least bear
witness to the fact thd some Irish are gay, lesbian or bisexual, and
the presence of the organized marchers would suggest their view
that people of their sexual orientations have as much claim to unqualified social acceptance as heterosexuals and indeed as m embers
of parade units organized around other identifYing characteristics.
The parade's organizers may not believe these facts about Irish
sexuality to be so, or they may object to unqualified social acceptance of gays and lesbians . . .. 109

Referring frequently to the case of West Virginia u. Barnette,
the Court held that it would constitute the most serious possible violation of the First Amendment to require the parade
organizers so to propound a message with which they disagreed.
The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to
produce thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or,

106

As the name of the case indicates, the group's
can Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston. See
107
See id. at 2341-43. GLIB had marched in the
strength of a court order and against the wishes of
participation that year was "uneventful." l d.
108
ld. at 2345.
109
ld. at 2348.

full nam e is the Iri sh -Ameriid. at 234 1.
parade in 1992, also on the
the parade organi zers. Their
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indeed, all people, grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to
nothing less than a proposal to limit s peech in th e service of orthodox expression. The Speech Clause has no more certain antithesis .110

Here, the "propounding" of the contested m essage was a ccomplished by the parade organizers' silence.
Having determined that parades constitute an expressive
activity with a sufficiently coherent message to warrant First
Amendment protection, 111 the Cour t had t o decide whether
GLIB's presence threatened to alter that m essage . The dynamic of silence-as-endorsement drove the Court's inquiry into the
relationship between parade participant and parade organizer.
"Parades and demonstrations," the Court observed, "... are
not understood to be ... neutrally presented or selectively
viewed." 112 Rather, the Court concluded, a parade speaks
with one voice: that of its organizer. This "univocal" character
of the parade renders impractical any disclaimer as to an
organizer's endorsement of a particular message in a parade.
The organizer is effectively disabled from expressing any dissent; hence, he is forced to endorse every message that the
individual parade units present. Exercising control over the
parade's composition, the Court explained, is the only effective
way to exercise control over the parade's message.
Although each parade unit generally identifies itself, each is understood to contribute something to a common theme, and accordingly
there is no customary practice whereby private spo nsors disavow
any identity of viewpoints between themselves a nd the selected
participants. Practice follows practicability here, for such disclaimers
would be quite curious in a moving parade 113

The holding in Hurley is entirely predicated upon this
dynamic of silence-as-endorsement. By the opinion's terms ,
there would be no interference with the Council's message if
"GLIB's participation would [not] likely be perceived as having
resulted from the Council's customary determination about a
unit admitted to the parade, that its message was worthy of
presentation and quite possibly of support as well." 114 A simi-

11 0

Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2350.
See id. a t 2345-46.
112
Id. at 23 49.
113
Id. (quotation omitted).
'" Id. at 2348 .
111
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lar treatment of the expressive power of silence has determined the outcome of many of the Court's Speech Clause cases. tts

The Court has also applied this common-sense und erstanding of the meaning and effect of silence outside the realm of
the First Amendm ent. A number of examples are to be found
in the law of evidence. One is the common-law doctrine of
"impeachm ent by silence. " If a declara nt has remained silent in
a situation where she might reason ably be expected to speak
or be fo rthcoming with certain information, that silence might
serve to im peach any related testimony that she later offers as
a witness. As the Court has pointed out, "[c]ommon law traditionally h as allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which that fact
naturally would have been asserted." 116 The witness' past
failure to state a fact is treated as evidence that the witness
actually believes the converse of that fact to be true.
Similarly, an individual's failure to dispute a statement

115

F or example, in Pacific Gas & Electric, the Court inva lid ated a s tate ordinance that forced utility companies to bundle conservationist environmental literature with the bills that they mailed to their customers. The literature conflicted
w ith the companies' own viewpoints a nd, a rgu ably, with their business interests .
The company s ucceeded in h av ing the ordinance struck down on Speech Clause
grounds because of the possibility tha t the compa ny's silence might be interpreted
as an endorsement of the literature. The Court found th at the compa ny "m ay be
forced ei ther to appear to agree with [the literatu re] or to res pond," and tha t the
State cannot so "compe l . . speakers to propound political messages." Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co . v. Public Uti!. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 15 -1 6 (1986) (plurality
opinion). Cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robin s, 447 U .S. 74, 87 (1980) (r equiring owner of shopping m a ll to provide access for speakers a nd disallowing Speech
Cl a use claim of owner on grounds that owner "can express ly disavow a ny connection with the message by s imply posting signs in the a rea where the s peakers or
h an dbillers stand" ); Turner Broad., Inc. v. FCC , 512 U.S. 622, 65 5 (1994) (disallowing claim of cable operators that "mus t-carry" provisions will lead to impermissible attribution of messages because, "[g]iven cable's long history of se rving as a
cond ui t for broadcast signa ls, there appears little risk that cable vi ewers would
assume that t he broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey id eas or
m essages endorsed by the cable operator").
116
J enkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 (1980). S ee also 3A J. WI GMORE,
EVIDE NCE § 1042, at 1056 (1970). This maxim finds an ironic and u nfortunate
counterpart in a recent se ries of cases in which the military has refused to believe
a serv icemembe r's a dmission th a t he or she is gay without furth er "corroborating
proof. " The military has ap parently expressed a concern tha t a service member who
h as never before given the military any reason to believe that he or she is gay
might ma ke such an assertion "opportunistically," as a means of getting out of a
s erv ice commitment. See SLDN REPORT, supra note 47, at 9.
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that is made in his presence may sometimes constitute evidence of his acqui escence in th a t statement. In particular, the
Court has suggested that such reticence is likely to be probative where accusations of wrongdoing go una n swered. Justice
Marshall explored this dynamic in United States u. Hale. 117
In Hale , a crimin al defendant h a d refrained from offering exculpatory eviden ce that was in his possession when the police
first arrested him fo r a robbery, and the prosecution used the
defendant's earlier silence against him when he offered that
exculpatory evidence at trial. The Court held that the
defendant's failure to offer exculpatory evidence during a police
interrogation was not sufficiently probative t o be used against
him on the stand, but it went on to discuss the circumstances
under which such a use of silence as evidence might be allowable.
Silence gains more probative wei ght where it persists in the face of
accusation, since it is assumed in such circumstances that the accused would be more likely than not to dispute an untrue accusation. Failure to contest a n assertion, however, is considered evidence
of acquies cence only if it would have been natural under the circumstances to object to the assertion in question. 118

As Justice Marshall's cautionary tone suggests, the cases
discussed in this section should not be read for the proposition
that silence always constitutes an affirmative endorsement of
some identity or belief. If that were so, then state officials
could not maintain decorum at public speeches or convocations
without threatening to "compel orthodoxy" and trench on constitutional interests-a result tha t would be as unnecessary as
it would be untenable .119 What cases like Hurley and

117

422 U.S . 171 (1975).
us !d . at 176. Of cou rse, this line of cases implicates the criminal defenda nt's
Fifth Amend ment right not to testify in a proceeding against him. See Grunewald
v. United States , 353 U.S . 391 (1957) (holding tha t defendant's invoca tion of privilege against sel f-incriminati on before grand jury cannot be used to impeach his
testimony at trial). These are not Speech Clause cases . None theless, the Court's
treatment of silence as constituting an affirmative utterance in these cases relies
upon a common und erstanding of social interactions a nd not any particular ana lytical or constitutional framewo rk . That trea tment has transubstantive implications.
uo As Ju sti ce Scalia colorfu lly writes in his dissent in Lee v. Weisman , "surely
'our social conventions' . .. have not coarse ned to the point tha t anyone who does
not stand on his ch a ir and shout obscenities can reasonab ly be deemed to h ave
assented to everything said in his presence. " Wei sman, 505 U.S. at 637 (Scalia, J. ,
dissenting).
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Weisman require is an inquiry that is sensitive to the context
in which a contested silence appears. In Hurley, for example,
J ustice Souter locates this inquiry in the nature of the relationship that exists between a speaker and a message. He
writes, "[W]hen dissemination of a view contrary to one's own
is forced upon a speaker intimately connected with the communication advanced, the speaker's right to autonomy over the
m essage is compromised." 120 In this formulation, it is the existence of an "intimate connection" between the speaker and
the communication advanced that is the appropriate object of a
careful and context-sensitive inquiry.
Framed in more general terms, this requirement is familiar to First Amendment jurisprudence. The Court has frequently noted that it has a responsibility to conduct a delicate
and fact-sensitive inquiry in order to determine the import and
meaning, in context, of the utterances that it is asked to review.121 It is one of the distinctive features of the Court's
analysis in Speech Clause cases that it conducts a de novo review of findings of fact, even those made by state trial courts,
in the course of adjudicating litigants' free speech claims. 122
The obligation is one that "rests upon [the Court] simply because the reaches of the First Amendment are ultimately defined by the facts it is held to embrace." 123 In Hurley, the
Court deployed these maxims to justify its rejection of the
Massachusetts trial court's finding that the Boston parade did
not constitute expressive activity meriting First Amendment
protection. 124 The Justices looked to historical, judicial and
scholarly sources that treated parades as expressive public
spectacles, finding that the Massachusetts courts had undervalued the expressive importance of the Boston event. 125

120

Hurley , 115 S. Ct. at 2348.
See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs, Wabaunsee County v. Umbehr, 116 S.
Ct. 2342, 2344 (1996) (acknowledging necessity for "fact-sensitive" review of record ).
122
See, e.g. , New York Times Co. v . Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964) (holding
that Court has obligation to "make an independ ent examination of the whole record ... so as to assure [itselfl that [the lower court's factual determination] does
not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression") (quotation
omitted).
123
Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2344.
12
' See id. at 2344-46.
125
See id. a t 2344-45 (discussing S. DAVIS, PARADES AND POWER: STREET
12 1
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While this type of inquiry is less attractive than one that can
rely upon bright lines and clear distinctions, that infirmity is
endemic to the field of First Amendment analysis as a whole.
To assert that an informed understanding of the lived experience of gay servicemembers is necessary in order properly to
analyze the effects of the silence that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell
policy imposes is to place that analysis squarely within a jurisprudential tradition that the Court has elevated to the status
of a "constitutional duty." 126
Such an informed understanding of gay experience provides guidance in assessing the communicative weight of gay
servicemembers' compelled silence in the face of the constant
presumption of their heterosexuality. Justice Marshall's dictum
in Hale makes the point aptly. "Silence gains ... probative
weight where it persists in the face of accusation, since it is
assumed in such circumstances that the accused would be
more likely than not to dispute an untrue accusation." 127 One
need not characterize the heterosexual presumption as an
"accusation" to recognize that it constitutes a pervasive and
forceful assertion about one of the most personal aspects of an
individual's life, one that any individual would "be more likely
than not to dispute [if it were] untrue." 128 Most frequently,
when a gay person chooses not to dispute that false presumption, she is operating under some form of compulsion. 129 Of-

THEATRE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILADELPHIA (1986); Gregory v . Chicago, 394
U.S. 111 (1969); and Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963)).
126
Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2344. Justice Souter chose this phrase advisedly. As
noted above, the Court reopens findings of fact made by federal district courts for
de novo review in First Amendment cases, despite the clear command of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) that findings of fact made by district courts be set
aside only if they are clearly erroneous. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). The impetus for
this overriding of a federal rule proceeds directly from the First Amendment. See
Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2344.
127
Hale, 422 U.S. at 176.
128
ld. See also EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 3
(1990) (" 'Closetedness' itself is a performance initiated as such by the speech act
of a silence.").
129
For example, Professor Halley describes the plight of James Michael
McConnell, who was fired from his job as a college librarian for refusing to remain silent about his relationship with another man-an action upheld by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. See McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th
Cir. 1971). Halley writes, "Rather than force a helpless university to blazon its
employee's political views, the court insists that the employee must remain silent
about them and, by semiotic default, proclaim the ubiquity and normalcy of het-
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ten, the compulsion arises from the fear of rejection and social
disapprobation that keeps many gay people in the closet for
large portions of their lives. In the case of the Don't Ask, Don't
Tell policy, however, no such r eferenc e to social forces is required, for the compulsion is the avowed purpose of the policy.

III. T HE INTERSECTION OF AFFIRMATION AND IDENTITY
In order to analyze a restriction on a n individual's abili ty
to give voice to h er identity-and to assess the weight of the
burden that such a r es triction might impose by compelling h er
to affirm a false id entity-it is important to distinguish between the regulation of the modes of expressing an identity, on
the one h a nd, and the regulation of identity itself, on the other. A restriction on one particular mode of expressing an identity will usually leave the speaker with ample alternative avenues for identifYing herself. Thus, the silence that such a restriction requires ordinarily will not carry with it any forcibly
imposed, implicit message. It is the direct regulation of an
individual's identity that carries with it the greatest threat of a
compelled affirmation .
The case of Goldman v. Weinberger 130-a military First
Amendment case-illustrates the effect of a regulation aimed
primarily at the modes of expression of an individual identity,
rather than the identity itself. Goldman, an ordained rabbi and
orthodox Jew, was a doctor and officer on active duty in the
Air Force. In 1981 , he ran afoul of an Air Force dress regulation that prohibited servicemembers from wearing any unauthorized headgear, including the yarmulke that Goldman considered a neces sary part of his religious observance. 131 After

erosexuality." Halley, supra note 5, a t 971. See also Rich, supra note 35, at 22.
130
475 U.S. 503 (1986).
13 1
Goldman itself is framed primarily as a Free Exercise case. However, the
Co ur t has consis tently confl ated Speech Clause and Re ligio n Claus e analysis in its
military cases, applying the same nebulous standard to a ll such claims . Thus, the
Court cites its military Speech Clause cases when conducting military Religion
Clause analysis, see, e.g., Goldman, 475 U.S. at 506-07 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733 (1974)), and the Courts of Appeals have cited both types of cases, including Goldman , in their a n a lysis of the Don't Ask, Don't Te ll policy. See, e.g.,
Thomasson v. Perry, SO F.3d 915 , 933 (4th Cir. 1996) (en bane) (relying on
Goldman in analysis of Speech Clause cla ims). See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 591 (1992) ("The Free Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and
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receiving a reprimand and poor evaluation for the dress code
violation, Goldman brought suit, claiming that this application
of the code to an orthodox J ew violated the First Amendment.
The Court, per then-Justice Rehnquist, disallowed his claim.
The majority acknowledged that the wearing of a yarmulke
was "required by [Goldman 's] religious beliefs" and that it constituted an important expressive act by which he sought to
identify himself as Jewish. 132 Nonetheless, they found that
the military's interest in promoting obedience by requiring outward uniformity outweighed Goldman's indivi dual rights.
[T]he traditional outfitting of personnel in standardized uniforms
encourages the subordination of personal preferences and identities
in favor of the overall group mission. Uniforms encourage a sense of
hierarchical unity by tending to eliminate individual distinctions
except for those of rank. 133

A holding that provides that the military may freely require soldiers to subordinate their "personal preferences and
identities" might at first seem to present a difficult obstacle to
a gay servicemember who seeks to challenge the Don't Ask,
Don't Tell policy on the grounds that it forces him to affirm a
false identity. However, recalling exactly what the Air Force
was and was not empowered to do in Goldman places that
apparent obstacle in perspective. The Air Force had not deprived Goldman of the right to identifY himself as Jewish; it
had deprived him of one particular mode of publicly expressing
his Jewish identity. Even after the Air Force forced him to
comply with its uniform dress code, Goldman remained free to
tell anyone and everyone that he was a rabbi and an orthodox
Jew. As important as the yarmulke was to Goldman as a form
of religious observance, it was not the only means by which he
could make his identity known.
To articulate the distinction in starker terms: The Air
Force did not compel Goldman to pretend that he was Catholic.
A regulation requiring Goldman to adopt a facade of Christianity would have been a literal "compelled orthodoxy" 134-a

worship that has close parallels in the speech provisions of the First Amendment . . . . ").
132
See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 510.
133
!d. at 508.
13
' Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
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direct regulation of his identity-and would present a true
parallel to the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. It was not
Goldman's identity, but the method he chose to express that
identity, that Goldman u. Weinb erger empowered the Air Force
to regulate. Thus, under Goldman, a gay man in the military
could probably be prohibited from wearing a button bearing a
pink tria ngle and the slogan, "S ILENCE=DEATH," even if he
were profoundly committed to the fight against AIDS and
considered the button to be a uniquely meaningful expressive
symbol. 135 But Goldman did not empower the military to require its Jewish soldiers to attend Christmas functions, go to
church on Sundays, and bow their heads while their peers said
grace at mealtime, all the while remaining completely silent as
to their true, Jewish identity. By the same token, it does not
lend support to a policy that directly regulates the identities of
gay servicemembers, forcing them constantly to affirm a false,
heterosexual identity. 136
Indeed, Professor Cover would recognize the dress regulation that Goldman upheld as a natural incident of a strong
imperial institution like the military. As Cover explains, his
use of the term "imperial" is deliberately evocative of "the price
that is paid in the often coercive constraints imposed on the
autonomous realization of normative meanings." 137 Cover argues, in other words, that the commitment of an individual to
her religious, cultural or personal identity is sometimes constrained or muted in a strong imperial institution in order to
secure the stabilizing benefits that such an institution has to
offer. 138 Cover distinguishes between such "critical[ly]

135

See generally Yoshino , s upra note 29 , at 1781-93 (discussing importance of
pink triangle as symbol in gay community); HEINZ HEGER, THE MEN WITH THE
PINK TRIANGLE (David F ernbach trans., 1994) (documenting persecution of gay men
during Holocaust and use of pink triangle to identify gay prisoners in Nazi concentration camps).
136
In her recent Article, Professor Halley has traced the conceptual and doctrinal steps tha t led to the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. See Halley, supra note 9. In
what I take to be a simil a r observation to my own, Halley characterizes the "Don't
Tell" component of the policy as "a pervasive and intim a te system of identity regulation." Halley, supra note 9, at 179.
13 7
Cover, supra note 58, at 13 n.36.
138
As Professor Cover puts it:
Maintaining the world is no sma ll matter and requires no less energy
than creating it. Let loo se, unfettered, the worlds created would be unstable and sectarian in their social organization, dissociative and incoher-
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objectiv[e]" 139 constraints on the expression of all individual
identities, on the one hand, and the direct regulation or exclusion of just certain identities, on the other. He characterizes
the direct regulation of certain identities as a proper activity
only for nongovernmental, sectarian communities. 140
The Supreme Court's identity jurisprudence has taken
shape around a similar distinction . In contrast to Goldman,
the Court did review-and strike down-a direct regulation of
identity by the government in Hurley u. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston. 141 Recall that in
Hurley, the Court quashed an injunction requiring the .Allied
War Veterans Council to admit the GLIB parade unit, finding
that the effect of the injunction would be to force the Council
to propound a message with which it disagreed. In its analysis
of the Council's claim, the Hurley Court reproduces the asseverations that the Council forwarded in litigation, accepts them
as a legitimate account of the Council's intended message, and
bases its analysis upon that message. 14 2 The message consists
primarily in the Council's definition of its own Irish identity.
As the Court says, "a contingent marching behind the
organization's banner would at least bear witness to the fact
that some Irish are gay, lesbian or bisexual .... The parade's
organizers may not believe these facts about Irish sexuality to
be so .... "143 What the Council wished to assert, in other

ent in their discourse, wary and violent in their interactions. The sober
imperial mod e of world maintenance holds the mirror of critical objectivity to meaning, imposes the discipline cf institutional justice upon norms ,
and places the constraint of peace on the void at which strong bonds
cease.
Cover, supra note 58, at 16.
139
Cover, supra note 58, a t 16.
140
See Cover, supra note 58, at 33 ("Even an accommodationist sectarian position-one that goes to great lengths to avoid confrontation or the imposition upon
adherents of demands that will in practice conflict with those imposed by the
state-establishes its own meaning for the norms to which it and its members
conform.").
141
115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
142
The Court goes on, however, to disavow any req~irement that a litiga nt
pressing such a claim define its intended message with a high degree of particularity. See id. at 2345, 2348 ("[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a
condition of constitutional protection . . . . [W]hatever the reason, it boils down to
the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view . . .").
143
Jd . at 2348. I choose to concentrate here on the component of the Council's
message that involves the composition of the Irish-American community r ather

1190

BROOKLYN L4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 63: 1141

words, was that its Irish identity was a heterosexual one, unrelated to, and mutually incompatible with, homosexuality.
Upholding the right of the Council to exercise control over
its message concerning its Irish identity necessarily entailed
upholding the right of the Council to control the composition of
the parade. Since "GLIB's participation would likely be perceived as having resulted from the Council's customary determination about a unit admitted to the parade," 144 the prospect of a visible gay presence in the parade threatened to alter
the Council's message by "bear[ing] witness to the fact that
some Irish are gay, lesbian or bisexual." 145 In order to march
in the parade without presenting such a threat, gay and lesbian Irish-Americans would have had to march "dispersed
throughout John Hurley's crowd," as Professor Eskridge has
put it, so that "their sexual orientation would [be] invisible to
the audience." 146 In awarding the Council a victory, the Court
recognized that the group had a vital interest in controlling the
public's perception of its identity as an Irishness that is naturally and necessarily heterosexual. 147 The "belief' that Massa-

than the portion of its message that deals with the "social acceptance" of gay men
and lesbians within that community, see id., because the former component focuses
more closely on individual identity rather than on matters of political and social
disputation. That said, there are important arguments to be made for the proposition that speech concerning gay identity is necessarily political in nature, at least
in contemporary America. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 8, at 1440-43, 1509-13. As
Professor Yoshino has explained, because sexual orientation is an invisible identifying characteristic-one, moreover, that is collectively repressed in ordinary public
discourse-gay identity is always already contested when it is brought out into the
open. See Kenji Yoshino, The Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection, 108 YALE
L.J. (forthcoming 1998).
144
Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2348. As Professor Eskridge has pointed out, the "customary" mode of determination that the Council employed in selecting units for
the parade was one of almost automatic acceptance. Unlike in the New York Saint
Patrick's Day parade sponsored by the Ancient Order of Hibernians, which also
has been the subject of a battle over gay participation, the Boston group exercised
very little discretion in the admission of units, rejecting only four applications
(including GLIB's) in the parade's history. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and
Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2458-59 (1997).
145
Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2348; cf. Elzie v. Aspin, 897 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C.
1995) ("[T]he Supreme Court made clear in [Hurley] that the statements of selfidentification of sexual orientation may contain a quite specific message . . . . The
Hurley Court recognized that the statement 'I am homosexual' expresses a viewpoint.").
1 6
Eskridge, supra note 144, at 2461.
'
147
Professor Eskridge has characterized the Council's message as one of "com-
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chusetts could not "compel" the Council to "affirm[ )" 148 was a
belief in the particular nature of the ethnic and sexual identity
that the Council claimed for itself and its members.
This result also entails a recognition of the operation of
the heterosexual presumption. The marchers in the Boston
Saint Patrick's Day parade carried no banners proclaiming the
heterosexu ali ty of the parade's organizers, its units, or its
participants. S uch banners were not necessary for the Council
to communicate its message of heterosexual Irishness-and to
do so in a fashion that the Court was able to recognize without
difficulty-b ecause a heterosexual identity is presumed to be a
part of ordinary social interactions unless an individual chooses to disavow that identity explicitly. For the same reason,
Justice Souter's reassurance that "open" gay and lesbian
marchers were welcome in the parade depends for its logical
coherence upon the operation of the heterosexual presumption.149 It is only because the parade's audience would presume an otherwise-unidentified marcher to be heterosexual
that individual gay and lesbian marchers could participate in
the parade without altering the Council's message of heterosexual Irishness. 150

pulsory heterosexu a lity," see Eskridge, supra note 144, at 2459, aptly drawing
upon the insights of Adrienne Rich that are discussed in the previous Part. S ee
supra note 35 and accompanying text.
"' Hurley , 115 S. Ct . a t 2347.
149
See id.
150
Indeed, it a ppea rs that the Court is se ekin g to mitigate the less attra ctive
implications of th e a n a lytical framework it h as articulated with its suggestion that
it was the "admiss ion of GLIB as its own pa r ade unit carrying its own ba nn er "
that tru ly drove th e co ntroversy in Hurley a nd not the mere "participation of
openly gay, les bi a n , or bisexua l individuals in va rio us [oth er] units admitted to the
parade ." Id. a t 23 47 . While seemingly attractive as a means of downplaying the
intolerance of the Co uncil's pos ition, however , the s pa ce that this distinction ca rves
out is a very s ma ll one, indeed. What could the Court mean, after a ll , when it
suggests that the pa rti cipa tion of "openly" gay, lesbia n or bisexual people was not
contested in Hurl ey? Does it mean for "open" to refer only to the perceptions of
other marchers , s ugges ting that gay men and lesbi a ns remained "free," for example, to discuss their s a me-sex spouses with oth er parade participants, but only so
long as they were not otherwise identifiable as gay and marched anonymously in
the parade? Within the context of the Court's a nalysis, this constrained reading is
necessary in order to m ake any sense of the asse rtion that "open" gay men and
lesbians were fr ee to m arch. The Court could not h ave meant "open" to refer to
the perceptions of the pa rade's a udience , for it would run directly contrary to the
logic of the opinion to a llow the State to r equire th e participation of this latter
kind of "openly gay" individual while forbiddin g the S ta te to mandate the inclusion
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Similarly, although the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy contemplates that gay people will serve among the ranks of the
armed forces, it relies upon the ideological imperative of the
heterosexual presumption to place its brand upon them. By
forbidding expressions of gay identity in any form, at any time,
and with any individual-including a servicemember's family
and friends-the policy compels servicemembers constantly
and affirmatively to express a sexual identity of the military's
choosing. 151 Indeed, some of the servicemembers interviewed
for this Article suggested that the heterosexual presumption
has dominated social interactions in the military even more
actively since the Don't Ask, Don't T ell policy was put into
place. 152 Since sexual orientation was made a matter of active
concern in the military while the new policy was being debated, they have suggested, servicemembers are now more anxious to proclaim their heterosexuality loudly-and to put pressure on those around them to do the same-than they were

of GLIB.
If any individual marcher in the parade were identifiably gay-if he held
hands with his same-sex partner, for example, or if he were a famous public figure who was widely known to be gay because he had come out of the closet on
national television-then the presence of that individual would as much "bear
witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian or bisexual," id. at 2348, as
would a GLIB parade unit. Professor Eskridge makes a similar observation in
pointing to the disturbing possibility that the Court's reasoning in Hurley could
have been employed to exclude women or black people from the Boston parade
altogether, since gender and racial identities are more clearly visible than is sexual orientation. See Eskridge, supra note 144, at 2460. The Court's opinion in
Hurley rests on the understanding that whenever an identity is perceived to be
present-whether that identity is implicit, like the presumed heterosexuality of the
marchers in the Boston parade, or explicit, like a hypothetical Irish counterpart to
Ellen DeGeneres or Congressman Barney Frank-the identity constitutes meaningful and intelligible speech.
151
See supra note 48. As Professor Halley has said, "[t]he new policy apparently provides for the discharge of servicemembers who disclose anything about their
relationship to homosexuality--even a desire for information about it-to any·
one--even a single individual in the apparent privacy of a therapeutic relationship." Halley, supra note 9, at 181. Indeed, the military has vigorously pursued
this avenue of investigation and subpoenaed harmful testimony from the mothers
and fathers of servicemembers, both under the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy and
under the blanket ban that preceded it. See SLDN REPORT, supra note 47, at 9
(detailing use by Navy investigators of conversations between seamen and family
members as evidence in separation proceeding); SHILTS, supra note 70, at 99-204
(chronicling "witch hunts" for gay and lesbian servicemembers pursued under blanket exclusion).
152
See, e.g., Benecke Interview, supra note 38.
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under the blanket exclusion. 153 Whether or not this observation holds true as a general proposition, it remains the case
that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy capitalizes upon the heterosexual presumption to enforce a direct regulation of the
sexual identities of gay and lesbian servicemembers.
IV. COMPELLED SILENCE

AS COMPELLED AFFIRMATION

The case of West Virginia u. Barnette, in which the Court
struck down the practice of compulsory school flag salutes, is
the necessary starting point for analyzing any compelled affirmation. Before beginning that analysis, however, a word about
the impact of the military context on a servicemember's First
Amendment rights is called for. The Court has frequently noted-though not without dissent-that servicemembers enjoy
reduced First Amendment protections in the military. 154
There are some restrictions on speech that may be permissible
in the armed forces even though they would be intolerable in
civilian life. 155 This is no less true of Barnette-style claims

153

See Beneke Interview, supra note 38. As Professor Halley has observed:
In units where the 1993 revisions are vigorously or even intermittently enforced, ... servicemembers who want the protection of heterosexual identity
will have to strive very hard to signify their entitlement to it-and they are
liable to be harmed rather than helped by the volatility of the semiotic system that the new rules provide (supposedly) for their benefit.
Halley, supra note 9, at 219.
154
As the Court has written:
[W]hile members of the military services are entitled to the protections of the
First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of
the military mission requires a different application of those protections. The
rights of military men must yield somewhat to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty . . . .
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) (citations omitted) (quotation marks
omitted). But see Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 516 n.2 (1986) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("I continue to believe that Government restraints on First Amendment rights, including limitations placed on military personnel, may be justified
only upon showing a compelling state interest which is precisely furthered by a
narrowly tailored regulation.").
155
See Parker v . Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) ("The fundamental necessity
for obedience [in the military], and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it."). But see Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304
(1983) (" '[O]ur citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes.' ") (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of
Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U . L. REV. 181, 188 (1962)).
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than it is of limitations on political advocacy 156 or public demonstration 157-a fact of which the Barnette Court itself explicitly made note. 158 There are some practices in the military
that could properly be described as "compell ed affirmations"
that are entirely appropriate and could not be call ed into question by a ny useful treatment of the First Amendment. The
r equirement that soldi ers salute their superior officer s provides
perha ps the most visible example. While the special considerations that a pply in the military context are as present in this
as in any other First Amendment analysis , I choose not to
explore the possible impact of those consideration s at length
here. The primary purpose of this Article is to analyze the
nature of the First Amendment interest that the Don't Ask,
Don't Tell policy burdens, not to argue that existing case law
absolutely compels a finding that the policy is unconstitutional.
Indeed, given the state of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence in the military context, no such argument is possible.
The Court has never articulated any sort of t est for the First
Amendment claims of military personnel, relying instead on a
form of analysis that is distinctly impressionistic .159 What is
more, the one limitation that the Court has consistently imposed on the military's ability to restrict servicemembers' First
Amendment rights is to require that any such restriction be
applied in a neutral and evenhanded fashion .160 The Don't
Ask, Don't Tell policy, which targets only the identities of gay

156

See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S . 348 (1980) (upholding r egul a tion prohibiting
members of Ai r Force from distributing written material on base without prior
consent of superior officer); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 73 3 (1974) (affirming conviction of Army captain who encouraged subordinates to refuse to fight in Vietnam
because of racial discrimination in troop assign ments).
157
See Greer v. Spack, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding Army regu latio ns allowing commanders to prohibit partisan political demons trations on Army property
othenvise open to civilian traffic).
158
See West Virgi nia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S . 624, 642 n.19
(1943) ("The Nation may raise armies a nd compel citizens to give military service . . . . It fo llows, of course, th at those s ubject to military discipline are under
m a ny d uties and may not cla im m a ny freedoms that we hold inviolable as to
those in civilian life.").
159
See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 528 (O'Connor, J ., dissenting) ("The Court rejects
Captain Goldman's claim without even the slightest attempt to weigh his asserted
right to the free exercise of his religion agai nst the interest of the Air Force in
uniformity of dress within the military hos pital. No test for fr ee exercise clai ms in
the military contex t is even a rticula ted, much less applied.").
160
See supra no te 69 , a nd cases cited therein.

1
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and lesbian servicemembers, clearly fails to satisfy this basic
limitation. Thus, I limit the focus of this Article to the nature
of the burden that the policy inflicts under West Virginia u.
Barnette and leave the ultimate question of the policy's constitutionality to the federal judiciary.
Barnette involved a challenge to a V./est Virginia law 16 1
that required all students, in both public and private schools,
to participate in courses on civics and government that included a mandatory salute and pledge of allegiance to the American flag. 162 The Court had recently upheld the practice of requiring such a pledge in the case of Minersville School District
u. Gobitis, 163 assuming its propriety as a general matter and
declining to afford an exemption on religious grounds to the
litigants before it. The appellees in Barnette , like the claimants
in Gobitis, were adherents to the Jehovah's Witness religion.
They sought to convince the Court that they merited the religious exemption that the Court had previously declined to
extend. The Court, however, handed the appellees an even
broader victory, overruling its decision in Gobitis and striking
down the compulsory flag salute statute, in its entirety, on
Speech Clause grounds. 164
The Court's language throughout Barnette is expansive
and its reliance on precedent sparse, 165 reflecting both the
16 1

See W. VA. CODE § 1734 (1941).
See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626 n.l. The pledge, which should be familiar to
anyone educated in an American public school, reads as follows: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which
it stands; on e Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." ld. at 628-629.
The words "under God," were added to the pledge at a later time.
163
310 U.S. 586 (1940).
164
See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. The recent currency of Gobitis made the
Barnette Court's decision to overrule that case noteworthy in its own right. Indeed,
the Court heard the case on appeal from a district court panel that had ruled for
the petitioners on the more narrow grounds that the Free Exercise Clause required West Virginia to accommodate their religious beliefs. See id. at 630. Commentators frequently invoke Barnette in discussing the principle of stare decisis
and the propriety of overruling recent, controlling precedent. See, e.g., Charles
Alan Wright, My Favorite Opinion-The Second Flag-Salute Case, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1297, 1297 (1996).
165
Aside from the Gobitis case itself, Justice Jackson cites only two cases involving free speech and fr eedom of conscience in his entire majority opinion: Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934), which upheld the right of the State to prescribe military training for students at public universities, and Stromb erg u. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), in which the Court held that the display of a red flag
as a symbol of opposition constituted speech meriting First Amendment protection.
162
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importance and the novelty of the First Amendment interest
that the Court recognized in the case. 166 In framing the nature of that claim, the Court extended the reach of its "free
speech" protection beyond the realm of simple speech or symbolic conduct and embraced freedom of conscience as a value
lying at the core of the First Amendment.
[T]h e co mpulsory f1ag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a
belief and an attitude of mind .... To S'Jstain the compulsory flag
salute we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the
individual's right to speak hi s own mind, left it open to public authoriti es to compel him to utter what is not in his mind. 157

At best, the Court found, such a compulsory exercise would
force the appellees to "simulate assent by words without belief
and by a gesture barren of meaning" 168 through an affirmation that they could disclaim after the exercise was over. At
worst, it would force them to "forego any contrary convictions
of their own and become unwilling converts to the prescribed
ceremony." 169 Either way, the result was the same: The statute imposed a burden on individual rights that was greater
even than that imposed by "censorship or suppression of expression of opinion" 170-a burden that could be warranted only "on even more immediate and urgent grounds" 171 than the

See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632-33.
166
Barnette was decided during World War II, and anxiety over totalitarianism
clearly served to inspire some of the Court's stirring rhetoric. Indeed, the Court
devotes some text and a paragraph-long footnote to the question of how closely the
physical component of th e fl a g salute resembles the obeisances that Adolf Hitler
required of the German people under Nazism, see Barnette, 319 U.S. at 627-28 &
n.3, and it draws an explicit contrast between its holding in Barnette and the
strategies of "our present totalitarian enemies." See id. at 641. Similarly, Justice
Frankfurter, writing in lone dissent, makes claims for moral authority by beginning with a reminder that, as a Jew, he "belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in history." See id. at 646 (Frankfurter , J., dissenting). Even the
Civil War was apparently weighing upon the Justices' minds in Barnette, as evidenced by their acknowledgment of the types of disagreement that the choice of
terms in the pledge might be expected to provoke. See id. at 634 n .14 ("Use of
'Republic,' if rendered to di stinguish our government from a 'democracy,' or the
words 'one Nation,' if intended to distinguish it from a 'federation,' open up old
and bitter controversies in our political history . . . . ").
167
Id . at 633-34.
168
Jd. a t 633.
,•• Id .
170
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633.
171
Id. At the time the Co urt decid ed Barnette, the clear and present danger
test still predominated in First Amendment analysis. S ee, e.g., id. ("[C]ensorship or
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grounds that other speech restrictions would require. Rejecting
the claim that the need for "national unity" as "the basis of
national security" 172 could provide the requisite urgency, Justice Jackson articulated a broad condemnation of those who
would seek to compel orthodoxy and radical uniformity in the
service of a coerced unanimity:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. 173

The core principles of Barnette have found wide application. Following its determination that the regulation of corporate speech is subject to the same kind of scrutiny as the regulation of an individual's speech/ 74 for example, the Court has
prohibited government from forcing corporations to propound
messages with which they disagree. In Pacific Gas & Electric
v. Public Utilities Commission, 175 a California utility company
successfully argued that the State could not force it to include
environmentalist literature with the newsletter that it sent
with its customers' monthly bills. "Were the government freely
able to compel corporate speakers to propound political mes-

suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the
expression presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is
empowered to prevent and punish."); see also Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919) ("The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.") (Holmes, J.). The Barnette Court's holding that compelled affirmations may
be justified only on a showing of "even more immediate and urgent grounds,"
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633, indicates, within the language that framed First
Amendment analysis at the time, the uniquely high degree of scrutiny that such
affirmations must receive.
172
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640 (quoting Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 595).
173
!d. at 642.
174
See First Nat'! Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) ("[Political speech] is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy,
and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than
an individual."). In Bellotti, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute that
placed restrictions on the efforts of corporations to influence the outcome of popular referenda. See also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Uti!. Comm'n of Cal., 475
U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("The identity of the speaker is not decisive in
determining whether speech is protected. Corporations and other associations, like
individuals, contribute to the 'discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to foster.") (citation omitted).
175
475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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sages with which they disagree," the Court found, the
protections of the First Amendment "would be empty, for the
government could require speakers to affirm in one breath that
which they deny in the next." 176 Barnette has also worked in
tandem with the Court's determi nation that the u se of money
for political advocacy constitutes expressive activity that merits
F ir st A111endment protection. 117 The case of Abood v. Detroit
Boa rd of Education 178 es tabli shed the proposition that workers cannot be forced, as a conditio n of their employment, to
contr ibute money to a union when that money will be used for
political a dvocacy th at is unrelated to the union's role as a
bargaining repres enta tive. ~ The "freedom of beli ef' that
Barnette protects is , the Court said in Abood, is "no less applicable"180 to such compulsory expendit ures.
The most significa nt re affirm a tion of Barnette as it applies
to the individual's interest in pers onal expression is ·wooley v.
Maynard. 18 1 Wooley concerned the placem ent of a state motto
on an automobile license plate . The pl aintiffs, George and
Maxine Maynard, wer e residents of the State of New Hampshire. Since 1969, that state h a s required vehicles to carry
license plates displaying the state's official motto, "Live Free or
Die." 182 The Maynards , who were adherents to the Jehovah's
Witness religion , 183 objected to being forc ed to display the
motto on their car and brought suit to enjoin the state from
prosecuting them for their repe a ted attempts to cover the motto with tape. The Supreme Court granted the Maynards their
injunction, grounding its holding firmly in the principles it first
17

176

Id . a t 16.
See Buckley v . Va leo, 424 U.S . 1, 22-23 (1976) (per curiam) (" Making a
contrib ution .. . enables like-minded persons to pool their reso urces in furtherance
of common political go a ls ... [and so) implicates fun dame ntal Firs t Amendment
inte rests. "); see a lso Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (reaffirming principle that "contributing to an orga nization for the purpose of spreading
a political message is protected by t h e Fi rst Amendment").
178
43 1 U.S. 209 (1977).
179
S ee id . at 234-35.
180
Id. at 235 .
181
430 U.S. 705 (1977 ).
182
See id. at 706.
183
Than kfully, the Court has never m ade a ny s uggestion that the Barnette line
of cases applies only to confirmed Jehovah's Witnesses. Cf. Intern ational Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U .S. 672 (1992 ); H effron v. International Soc'y
for Krishn a Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
177

1
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articulated in Barnette. In particular, the Court reiterated that
the First Amendment protects "freedom of thought" 184 as well
as the freedom to engage in various forms of speech and conduct. "The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking," it said, "are complementary components of the broader
concept of 'individual freedom of mind.' " 185 While the Court
recognized that "the affirmative act of a flag salute [that was
compelled in Barnette] involved a more serious infringement
upon per sonal liberties than the passive act of carrying the
state motto on a license plate," the latter requirement nonetheless "force[d] an individual . . . to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds
unacceptable." The State may not, the Court held, so "invade []
the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the
First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control." 186
The extent to which a forced message touches upon matters of conscience or intimate personal concern is the question
with which Barnette and its progeny are, ultimately, the most
concerned. That consideration almost certainly drives the individual speaker's indignation in most Barnette claims. But such
an interest is also, by its very nature, defined in wholly subjective terms. In Hurley, for example, the parade organizers' simple assertion that the compelled affirmation occasioned by
GLIB's participation violated their deeply held personal beliefs
concerning Irish sexuality was sufficient to support a Barnette
claim, despite the absence of any measurable external indicia
of their demonstrated commitment to those beliefs. 187 Thus,
although the dissonance between the speaker's beliefs and the
content of a compelled affirmation is the engine that drives the
Barnette doctrine, it does not provide a useful way of assessing
the relative seriousness of the burdens that different compelled
affirmations place upon involuntary speakers. For that, it is
necessary to develop more objective criteria with which to
compare such claims.

18

Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (1977).
Id. (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637 (Murphy, J., concurring)). See supra,
text accompanying notes 94- 95.
186
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (Murphy, J., concurring)).
187
See Eskridge, supra note 144, at 2459-60.
"
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Together, Barnette and Wooley suggest at least two axes
along which the seriousness of the burden imposed by a compelled affirmation may be measured: the degree of linkage (or
attenuation) that exists between the message and the speaker;
and the opportunity available to the speaker to make clear to
others her disagreement with the message she is forced to
propound. The first of these may be called the "intimacy axis"-the measure of how personally or intimately the speaker
is implicated by a compelled affirmation. The second we can
call the "dissension axis"-the measure of the opportunity that
the involuntary speaker retains to make known her disagreement with the message. 188 The compelled affirmations in
Barnette and Wooley are essentially complementary in the
manner in which they play out along these two axes.
In Barnette, there was no attenuation at all between the
mandatory pledge of allegiance and the individual student;
rather, the message was both immediate and personal. The
pledge itself was couched in solemn and earnest terms, and the
student was required both to speak the pledge out loud and to
accompany it with a salute indicating her sincerity in the
words that she spoke. On the other hand, there was ample
opportunity for the students in Barnette to make known to
others their disagreement with the pledge. Since the pledge
was conducted before classmates and teachers with whom the
students interacted on a daily basis, they could quite effectively qualify their participation in the pledge with explanations to
their peers that they were participating involuntarily and that
the pledge ran counter to their own beliefs. 189 Thus, it appar-

188

This attempt to develop objectively quantifiable a.xes ahng which to measure
the seriousness of a compelled affirmation bears some similarity to Professor
Rubenfeld's attempt, in his privacy analysis, to use objective criteria to describe
the extent to which a regulation "takes over" an individual's life. See Rubenfeld,
supra note 81, at 784. Rubenfeld does briefly discuss Barnette in his Article, but
he takes great pains to distinguish laws concerning speech and expression from
the privacy rights that he seeks to address. See Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 78487. Rubenfeld's anxiety over the proximity of Barnette and its progeny to his own
theory probably signals his desire to limit the scope of his theory and to insulate
it from the charge that it will lead to an explosion of "newly discovered" constitutional rights. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 785 ("Because of the signal
role that speech plays in political freedom and because of the express constitutional guarantee, government in this country can hardly forbid or compel citizens to
utter a single opinion without violating their rights.").
189
Recall that the Barnette Court did not consider it important w determine
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ently was the weight of the burden imposed under the intimacy axis that drove the Court's decision in Barnette.
In Wooley, the degree of linkage, or intimacy, between
speaker and message was less than that in Barnette, but the
speakers were less able to qualify their apparent endorsement
of the contested message. In addressing the former consideration, the Court noted the contrast between the "affirmative
act of a flag salute" and the "passive act of carrying the state
motto on a license plate" when it acknowledged that, between
the two requirements, the motto constituted the less "serious
infringement." 190 To render the distinction between the two
more precisely: The Maynards were not required to speak the
motto themselves but only to carry it on their property; thE.:
motto was couched in considerably less personal terms than
was the pledge, employing a collective "we" rather than a solemn "I"; and the motto's ubiquity and its rather inauspicious
placement on a license plate diminished the extent to which it
would ever be perceived as the personal averment of any individual speaker, the Maynards included. On the other hand, the
Maynards did not have the opportunity personally to disclaim
their endorsement of the State's motto to all the motorists and
pedestrians who would regularly see them displaying it-their
ability to expressly dissent was curtailed. 191 They could certainly have placed a bumper sticker on their car with some
sort of express disclaimer, but common sense suggests that
such an item would be neither very practical nor very effective

whether the statute before it required the students actually to believe the words
that they spoke or merely to recite them along with their classmates. See
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633 ("It is not clear whether the regulation contemplates
that pupils forego any contrary convictions of their own and become unwilling
converts to the prescribed ceremony or whether it will be acceptable if they simulate assent by words without belief and by a gesture barren of meaning."). Cf.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 16 (government cannot "require speakers to
affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next").
190
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
191
Compare id. ("New Hampshire's statute in effect requires that appellees use
their private property as a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideological message . . . . As a condition to driving an automobile . . . the Maynards must display 'Live Free or Die' to hundreds of people each day.") with id. at 717 n.l5 ("It
has been suggested that today's holding will be read as sanctioning the obliteration of the national motto, 'In God We Trust', from United States coins and currency. . . . [However,] [c]urrency is generally carried in a purse or pocket and
need not be displayed to the public.").
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and would make for a somewhat ridiculous spectacle in any
event. Thus, although the burden that the New Hampshire
statute imposed was lesser in "degree" 192 than that associated
with the compulsory flag salute in Barnette, the weight of that
burden under the dissension axis was sufficient to allow the
Maynards to prevail.
When measured along these two axes, the affirma tions of
heterosexual identity that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy
compels from gay servicemembers exhibit the worst characteristics of each of the affirmations in Barnette and Wooley.
Concerning the intimacy axis, the link between speaker and
message under the policy could not be more close . The facade
of heterosexuality that the policy requires gay servicemembers
to maintain serves to define the public identities by which they
are known, implicating every aspect of their social interactions.
Concerning the dissension axis, there is no opportunity for gay
servicemembers ever to make known their "disagreement" with
the heterosexual identity that the policy forces them to propound.193 Moreover, the only neutral disclaimer that one can
imagine a gay servicemember making-that is, a disclaimer
that would not violate the terms of the policy-would be the
repeated assertion, whenever a conversation carried intimations of a presumption of heterosexuality, that the
servicemember "does not mean by her participation in this
conversation to imply anything about her sexual orientation,"
or words to that effect. Even to frame the suggestion in words
demonstrates how impractical any such disclaimer would be.
More to the point, such a stultified and unnatural conversational handicap would reveal a servicemember's homosexuality
almost as quickly as would a bald assertion of her sexual orientation.194 In Hurley, the Court noted the unworkability of

192

Id. at 715.
Recall that even those statements that a servicemember makes to her family
and non-military friends can serve, without more, as the basis for a separation
proceeding under the policy. See supra notes 48, 151 and accompanying text. The
policy forces servicemembers to proclaim a false heterosexu a l identity, without
qualification, at all times and to a ll people.
19 1
' See Able v. U.S., 968 F. Supp. 850, 859 (E. D.N.Y. 1997) ("It is unlikely in
the extreme that any enlisted member fit to serve would believe that closeted
homosexua ls are not serving or would long retain that belief afte r asking another
enlisted member his or her sex ua l orientation and receiving the rep ly 'no comm ent.' ").
193
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any express disclaimer on the part of the parade organizers in
its analysis of their Barnette claim, concluding, "Practice follows practicability here, for such disclaimers would be quite
curious in a moving parade." 195 In this respect, "practice follows practicability" under the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy as
well.
The Court singled out compelled affirmations for categori cally different treatment in West Virginia u. Barnette, finding
that they imposed an even greater burden on an individua l's
First Amendment rights than do censorship and other straightforward restrictions on speech and advocacy 196 - t he
paradigmatic infringements on freedom of expression against
which we have traditionally understood the First Amendment
to offer protection. Even within that unique category of
disfavored state regulation, the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy is
extreme. The damage that the policy's compelled affirmations
of heterosexual identity inflict on the personal autonomy of gay
and lesbian servicemembers is more pervasive, more unrelenting and less subject to mitigation than any compelled affirmation that the Supreme Court has thus far been called upon to
reVIew.
CONCLUSION

This Article began by using an imaginary conversation to
illustrate its central thesis. Perhaps a second hypothetical will
serve as an appropriate conclusion in order to account for the
failure of the Federal Courts of Appeals to understand the
nature of the First Amendment interest that the Don't Ask,

195

Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S.
Ct. 2338, 2349 (1995). Compare, also, the Court's reaction in P.G & E. to the
environmental group's suggestion that the inclusion of a disclaimer on its material
would prevent any misattribution of its views to P.G. & E. and so would eliminate
the Barnette problem:
The presence of a disclaimer on TURN's messages does not suffice to eliminate the impermissible pressure on appellant to respond to TURN's speech.
The disclaimer serves only to avoid giving readers the mistaken impression
that TURN's words are really those of appellant. It does nothing to reduce
the risk that appellant will be forced to respond when there is strong disagreement with the substance of TURN's message.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S . at 16 n .ll (citations omitted).
196
See supra notes 165-173 and accompanying text.
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Don't Tell policy burdens . The Second, Fourth , Eighth and
Ninth Circuits have relied upon what might most charita bly be
described as a lawyer's argument in conducting their analysis.
They have reasoned that the policy merely uses a gay
servicemember's statement of her identity as evidence-that is,
evidence that she probably stands in violation of the policy's
prohibition on exhibiting a "propensity" to engage in homosexu al acts. 197 Because there is a "strong[] correlation . . . between those who state that they are homosexuals and those
who are at least likely to engage in [homosexual] acts," 198
thes e courts have explained, the policy's evidentiary use of
identity speech is an entirely rational one. That being so, they
have concluded, the policy presents no problem under the First
Amendment so long as the underlying conduct restriction is
valid. 199 It is time, finally, to dispel the apparent magic of

197
See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (Supp. 1997); Able, 88 F.3d at 1296. On the formal
definition of the term "propensity," see DoD Directive No. 1332. 14, encl. 3, pr. 1,
at H.l.b(2) ("propensity" is "more than an abstract preference to engage in homosexua l acts; it indicates a likelihood that a person engages in or will engage in
homosexual acts"); Able, 88 F.3d a t 1297-98 (deferring to government's definition
of "propensity" as indicating "likelihood" of engaging in proscribed conduct).
198
Able, 88 F.3d at 1296. See also Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 930 ("Such remarks
provide evidence of activity that the military may validly proscribe."); Richenberg,
97 F.3d at 262 (adopting Fourth Circuit's reasoning) .
199
See Able, 88 F.3d at 1296 n.8, 1300 (stressing contingent nature of this First
Amendment argument and remanding to district court for ruling on constitutionality of underlying conduct restriction).
Judge Kenneth Hall issued a vigorous dissent in Thomasson u. Perry. His
opinion, which was joined by Judges Ervin, Michael and Motz , criticizes the policy
prima rily on equal protection grounds. See Thomas son, 80 F.3d at 949- 52 (Hall, J.,
dissenting). Judge Hall takes aim at the validity of a ny restriction that purports
to rest on a distinction between sexual orientation and a "propensity" to engage in
broadly defined affectionate behavior. Arguing that this strained distinction has
nothing to do with " 'conduct' in any ordinary sense of the word," id. at 950,
Judge Hall concludes that Lt. Thomasson was discharged "only because he has
said that he is homosexual." Id. In other words, Jud ge Hall argues, the policy singles out servicemembers based on status alone, an action that is highly suspect
und er the Equal Protection Clause. Regarding the First Amendment implications of
the Navy's action, Judge Hall suggests that the only evidentiary value that
Thomasson's "admission" possessed was with respect to his sexual ori entation, and
not with respect to any conduct that could legitimately have served as a basis for
his discharge from the Navy. See id. at 953-54. The government's only possible
response to this objection, the Judge argues, is to "de fin e [the] speech as 'conduct. "' Id. at 954. At that point, the statute must be understood to "be targeted a t
suppressing the speech itself," and doing so for the impermissible purpose of accommodating "the prejud ices of heterosexual servicemen. " Id. Judge H a ll concludes
that, when the disingenuity of the distinction between homosexual "status" and a
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this speech-as-evidence argument.
Imagine for a moment that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell statute gave a somewhat more narrow definition of the statements
that constitute sufficient evidence to raise a presumption that
an individual stands in violation of the "propensity" restriction .
Suppose the statute provided that gay and lesbian soldiers
remain free to identify themselves honestly, with no adverse
effects, and that only statements indicating that a soldier actually intends to commit a "homosexual act" would raise the
damning presumption. Thus, if an openly gay servicemember
revealed to a friend that he planned to have a romantic encounter, or if he spoke excitedly of his plans to visit a brothel
in a foreign port-if, in other words, the servicemember said
anything to suggest that he was actively seeking to engage in a
"homosexual act"-then the military could take this as sufficient evidence of the servicemember's "propensity" and initiate
separation proceedings accordingly. A servicemember's mere
acknowledgment that he was gay, however, would not trigger
the policy, and all servicemembers would remain equally free
to make their respective sexual orientations known whenever
the occasion to do so might arise.
If the statute provided for this somewhat more refined
strategy for enforcing the "propensity" restriction, then the
policy would no longer compel gay servicemembers to affirm a
false identity. 200 Nonetheless, if an openly gay servicemember

"propensity" to engage in ordinary affectionate behavior is revealed, the speech-asevidence argument simply becomes inapplicabl e.
The project of this Article is to analyze the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy as it
is written, to demonstrate the burden that the policy-by its own terms-places on
the speech interests of gay and lesbia n servicemembers, a nd to point out the inadequacy of the a na lytical framework offered by the Second, Fourth, Eighth and
N inth Circuits to recognize and describe that burden . Judge Hall's dissent in
Thomasson takes aim a t the very consistency a nd coherence of the policy's found ations. The Judge calls into question, not the adequacy, but the propriety of the
majority's First Amendment analysis, arguing that the disingenuous and spurious
nature of the status/propensity distinction renders the speech-as-evidence argument
unavailable to the government. Judge Hall certainly h as not been alone in making
this argument. See, e.g., Halley, supra note 9, a t 183-218; Halley, supra note 9, at
220 ("We need to be a ble to describe the discriminations of the new military antigay policy in terms of the relationship between status and conduct, not by occluding one or the other."). The fact that this Article h as chosen an approach that
differs from Judge H a ll's should in no way be read as a repudia tion of his powerful attack on the legitim acy of the policy and the motives that underlie it.
200
I do not mean to s ugges t that the r egime outlined in this hypothetical is a
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living under this hypothetical policy were to tell a friend that
she planned to have a romantic encounter, and the military
used her statements as the basis for initiating a separation
proceeding, the speech-as-evidence argument might well suffice
to overcome any objection she might raise that this us e of her
statements impermissibly restricted her freedom of expression201-ass uming, as always, th a t the dou ble standard for
conduct and "propensity" that underlies the policy is itself valid. 202 The availability of the speech-as-evidence argument has
nothing to do with the question of whether the policy compels
gay servicemembers to make false affirmations of their sexual
identity. By the same token, when the policy does compel gay
servicemembers to make such false affirmations, the speech-asevidence argument does not serve to justify or mitigate the
burdens associated with those compelled affirmations. The two
analytical approaches simply address different First
Amendment questions. Thus, it is not a contradiction to observe that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy compels gay
servicemembers to make false affirmations of their sexual
identities at the same time that it provides for what might
otherwise be a permissible evidentiary use of their statements.
It is, rather, another way of demonstrating that the very definition of the conduct/propensity restriction, and the statements
that constitute sufficient evidence to raise a presumption that
the restriction has been violated, constitute the mechanism by
which the policy compels gay servicemembers to make these
false affirmations. 203

des irable one. While it wo uld cons titute an improvement ove r the current policy, it
would still punish a gay servicemember for conduct (and statements) that would
be en tirely permissible for a straight servicemember, and it would do so solely on
the basis of the gay servicemember's sexual orientation. Such a policy raises serious questions under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
201
See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489-91 (1993) (reaffirmin g principle
tha t "[t]he First Amend ment .. . does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech
to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent" and upholding
sentencing enhancement provision on grounds that it did not have effect of chilling
protected speech).
202
See Able, 88 F.3d at 1296 n.8, 1299.
203
This observation has implications that far exceed the sco pe of this Article.
For a deeper exploration of those implications, it is necessary to turn to the work
of Professor Halley, who has written extensively on the relationship between act
and identity-in particular , the relationship between sodomy and homosexual iden-
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For this reason, the mode of analysis that the various
Circuits have employed in their review of the policy is radically
incomplete . None of these reviewing courts has recognized the
expressive power of the silence that the policy compels gay
servicemembers to maintain; none has analyzed the manner in
which the policy compels gay servicemembers constantly to
affirm a heterosexual identity. 204 Indeed, the Ei ghth Circuit
panel that issued Richenberg u. Perry disposed of Captain
Richard Richenberg's First Amendment clai:rn.s in a section
that measured only two short paragraphs .205 That panel began its Speech Clause analysis with the follow-ing observation.
Under the prior policy, the military asked applicants if they were

tity-in exploring the powerful change that Bowers u. Hardwick worked upon the
legal landscape for gay, lesbian and bisexual people. See, e.g., Halley, supra note
5. Halley has repeatedly challenged the reflexive assumption that sodomy-or any
particular sexual act-is properly definitive of the class of "homosexuals." Rather,
she argues, "[t]he patterns that emerge from recent empirical and theoretical work
on the subject compel the conclusion that homosexual identity, far from being the
equivalent of sodomy, is constituted in precisely the political process which, under
the equal protection clause, the courts are pledged to protect." Halley, supra note
5, at 923.
204
In contrast, Judge Eugene Nickerson of the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of New York has evinced a deeper understanding of how the
policy operates. Judge Nickerson wrote the opinion that the Second Circuit reversed in Able. See Able v. U.S., 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), reu'd and
remanded, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d. Cir. 1996). While he rested his First Amendment
analysis on a rejection of the status/propensity distinction, see icl., at 973-76-an
approach similar to that adopted by Judge Hall in Thomasson , 80 F.3d at
930--Judge Nickerson's discussion of the government's unit cohesion argument displayed a welcome sensitivity to the degree of deception that is inherent in the
policy. As the Judge wrote, "[c]ommon sense suggests that a policy of secrecy,
indeed what might be called a policy of deception or dishonesty, will call unit
cohesion into question." Able, 880 F. Supp. at 979. ,Judge Hall acknowledged the
wisdom of this observation in his Thomasson dissent. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at
952 (Hall, J., dissenting).
On remand, Judge Nickerson again struck down the policy, this time on equal
protection grounds. In that opinion, the judge made a similar point without mincing words:
For the United States government to require those self-identifying as
homosexuals to hide their orientation and to pretend to be heterosexuals
is to ask them to accept a judgment that their orientation is in itself
disgraceful and they are unfit to serve. To impose such a degrading and
deplorable condition for remaining in the Armed Services cannot in fairness be justified on the ground that the truth might arouse the prejudice
of some of their fellow members.
Able v. U.S., 968 F. Supp 850, 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
205
See Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 262-63 (8th Cir. 1996).
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homosexual and excluded those who answered affirmatively. The
new policy is less restrictive-the military now ignores the issue
unless a service-member affirmatively evidences a propensity to engage in conduct inconsistent with military service. 206

Any court that concludes, after purportedly conducting a
searching First Amendment inquiry, that the forcibly imposed
closet of the new policy is "less restrictive" of servicemembers'
speech interests than was the blanket exclusion that preceded
it, betrays a lack of understanding of the lived experience of
gay and lesbian servicemembers that is inexcusable. 207 If this
Article has one purpose, it is to help to eliminate this species
of privileged ignorance. 208
Gay servicemembers did suffer many of the injuries and
indignities that this Article has described in equal measure
under the blanket exclusion that preceded the Don't Ask, Don't
Tell policy. Some gay people, when presented with an official
policy of exclusion, chose to hide their identities and enter the
military even though they knew that, in theory, they were not
supposed to be there. Others came to realize that they were
gay only after committing themselves to a life and a career in
military service. 209 In many cases, the harms that the old pol-

206

Id. at 263.
See also Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1136 (opining that, even when servicemembers
are discharged for nothing more than identifying themselves as gay, "the First
Amendment is not implicated."); Able, 88 F.3d at 1299-1300 (characterizing policy
as creating "a reasonable balance" between "a service member's privacy interest
and the military interest in prohibiting homosexual acts").
208
See Yoshino, supra note 29, at 1788-93 (discussing costs of "carefully cultivated" judicial ignorance of gay people and gay life); Sedgwick, supra note 18, at
23.
209
Allan Berube discusses this dynamic in his pathbreaking investigation into
the experiences of gay servicemembers during World War II. Berube's description
of the "psychological screening" process that the armed forces used in its attempt
to exclude gay people (and others who were "mentally unbalanced") provides a
good example of the hapless position in which young servicemembers often found
themselves then, and continue to now. Psychological "screeners" in the post-World
War I era regularly asked inductees, with varying degrees of directness, whether
they were gay. See BERUBE, supra note 74, at 8-32. Berube explains that many
inductees simply had not yet confronted the issue:
Gay selectees who said 'no' sometimes believed that they were telling
the truth. Some did not yet think of themselves as gay. In early 1942,
right after Pearl Harbor was bombed, twenty-year-old Woodie Wilson
enlisted in the Air Force at an induction station outside Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, where, he recalled, "I was asked the big question, 'Are you
a homosexual?' And I certainly said 'no' and didn't believe I was." Others
207
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icy inflicted were the direct result of the military's abusively
selective enforcement of the blanket exclusion. 2 10 Even when
the military did not deliberately abuse its authority, the impossibility of perfect enforcement--or even reasonably consistent
enforcement--of a policy that sought to exclude a class of peo-

could truthfully say no because they ha d not yet had any sexual experiences . . . . Still others had never heard the clinical term homosexual
before and guessed th at it didn't apply to them. "Going into the service
the word 'homosexual' was used," recalled Raymo nd Mailloux, who in
July 1943 was drafted into the Army in Fall River, Massachusetts , at the
age of eighteen. "And like everyone else, of course, I said 'no'. Because I
truly did not know what 'homosexual' meant. We didn 't call it that. We
called it more or less being 'queer' or 'fruit.' And it wasn't even till later
that I knew it pertained to women also."
Id. at 23-24.
Coming to terms with one's sexuality and embracing an adult identity is a
complicated process , a nd many of us do not complete the task before being confronted with important life decisions, including the decision of whether to join the
military. This is no less true of the servicemembers who agreed to be interviewed
for this Article . Among those who have already been introduced in the sections
above, neither Elizabeth Hillman nor Anonymous Officer Number One knew that
she was gay at the time that each entered her respective branch of the armed
forces. See Hillman Interview, supra note 34; Anonymous Interview Number One,
supra note 35; text accompanying note 213, infra. Indeed, as Michelle Benecke
points out, coming to terms with questions about one's sexuality is made all the
more difficult when one enters an environment where even discussing the issue
can result in immediate discharge. See Benecke Interview, supra note 38.
210
The story of Sergeant Perry Watkins provides one of the most extraordinary
examples of this kind of selective enforcement. His saga is told in gre a t detail in
Conduct Unb ecoming. See SHILTS, supra note 70, at 61-63, 79-80, 161- 62, 218-19,
230, 241-43 , 395-98. Watkins was inducted into the Army in 1968. From the first,
he openly told anyone who might wish to know that he was gay, in cluding the
psychiatrist who conducted his induction interview. Even so, the Army did not initially a ttempt to bar Watkins from service; quite the contrary, it actively sought
out his "non-heterosexual" services. \Vatkins was an accomplished drag queen, and
the Army enthusiastically employed him during the Vietnam War to entertain the
troops. The Army also repeatedly attempted to drum Watkins out of the service
over the years because he was gay, periodically "discovering" this damning piece of
information whenever it was convenient. Watkins' tenure in the Army is an almost
comic series of smash-hit, Army-sponsored performances as the fabulous "Simone"
interspersed with career-threa tening discharge proceedings.
When the Army finally tried to kick Watkins out of the service once and for
all, Watkins brought suit in federal court to fight his discharge. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, found the Army's course of conduct so outrageous that they applied an estoppel and refused to allow the military to use the
fact that Watkins was gay as grounds for his discharge-an unprecedented use of
this kind of equitable remedy against the military. See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane).
Sergeant Watkins died of complications resulting from the AIDS virus on
March 17, 1996. See N.Y. TIMES, March 21 , 1996, at 5.
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ple on the basis of an invisible characteristic left gay
servicemembers constantly exposed and vulnerable. It is for
these and many other reasons that a blanket exclusion of gay
people from a plur alistic State institution like the military
raises serious questions under the equal protection component
of the Fifth &-nendment to the Cons titution, particularly following the Supr eme Court's r ece nt decision in Romer v. Evans.ztt

Vvhatever else may be said about the blanket exclusion,
however, it never purported to embrace the infliction of such
harms upon gay servicemembers as the intended mode of the
policy's operation, never codified the infliction of such harms
into the letter of a regulation or statute. That is what the
Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy has done. By inviting gay people to
serve in the armed forces but compc;lling them to lie about the
most personal aspects of their identities, the new policy places
the power of the State behind an offense to servicemembers'
First Amendment rights that the military could previously
argue that most gay servicemembers were imposing upon
themselves. That compulsion, and the harms that attend it,
are now written into the definitions that drive the statute. 212

2 11

517 U .S. 620 (1996). See also Meinhold v. U.S. Dep't. of Defense , 34 F.3d
1469, 1477 (9th Cir. 1994) ("C onstruing the [blanket ban] to apply to the 'classification of being homosexual' clearly implicates equal protection. "); Able v. United
States, 968 F. Supp. 850 , 860 (E.D.N .Y. 1997) (characterizing as "weak" the argument that "sexual ten s ion s" engender ed by mere presence of openly gay
servicemembers might jus tify blanket exclusion of gay peo ple from military).
I have arg ued elsewhere th a t the decision in Romer constitutes a conscious
signal by the Court t hat it will henceforth be more solicitous of the civil rights
cl aims of gay litiga nts, a signa l t hat is deliberately evocative of the shift that the
Court effected in its gender-d iscrimination jurisprudence in the case of R eed u.
Reed, 404 U.S . 71 (1971 ). S ee Tobias Barrington Wolff, Case Note, Principled Silence, 106 YALE L.J. 247 (1996) . Ind eed, t he insensitive treatment that the F ederal
Courts of Appeals have afforded to the First Amendment cla ims of gay litigants
thus far , see supra, text accompa nyi ng notes 205-208 , is indicative of the kind of
"empathy fai lure" tha t s uggests that some form of heightened scrutiny for the
disfavored group might in fact be warranted. See Yoshino, supra note 29, at
1763-72, 1807; JOHN HAHT ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103, 160-64 (1980).
212
Compare Professor Halley's description of an opinion by the New Hampshire
Supreme Court construing and upholding a statute that forbid s gay people to
serve as foster parents. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (1987). In
that case, th e New Hampshire Court interprets the prohibition of the statute to
provide a n exception for people who have had same-sex sexual experiences but
who "did not intend them in such a way as to merit the label 'homosexual.' "
Halley, supra note 5, at 950; see In re Opinion of the Justices , 530 A.2d at 23-24.
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More even tha n the plain language of the statute, however, it is the stories of the gay servicemembers who have served
and who continue to serve under the Don't Ask, Don't Tell
policy that most clearly demonstrate what it me ans to live
inside the walls of a forcibly imposed closet. Anonymous Officer Number One-a courageous and honorable woman whose
willingness to add h er story to this Article touched the a uthor
very deeply-ended h er interview with the following sentiment.
I didn't know I w o.s gay wh en I j oined the service. Whe n I found out
I was gay, I kn ew t h e service didn't a ppreciate it. I know they will
kick me out if I don't stay quiet. But it feels rotten to h a ve to lie
eve ry day. After a ll , I'm gay 24 hours a d ay, whether or n ot I h a ve
s ex. It kills me t o have to lie to my clos e fri ends in the service about
s uch a n importa n t pa rt of my life . These are people who think
they're my very best friend s . Th ey don't even know m e.213

Over fifty years ago, Justice Jackson warned us of the
harm that could result from an attempt to compel complete
orthodoxy in matters of opinion and identity. "Those who begin
coercive elimination of dissent," he wrote, "soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of
opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard ....
[T]he First Amendment to our Constitution was designed to
avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings." 2 14 The Don't
Ask, Don't Tell policy invites gay men and lesbians to serve in
the armed forces only at the cost of living under a constant
compulsion to lie about who they are . It is to our great shame
that the federal judiciary has not yet understood this fact and
learned to employ an informed First Amendment analysis in
describing and reviewing the policy. Let us hope that the "fixed
star" 215 of We st Virginia u. Barnette can finally begin to light
the way.

As H a lley observes :

[This] catego ry incl udes individuals whose des ires m ay be predomina ntly
homosexual , who have acted on them, but who have determined to mask
these fa cts from t hemse lves by embracing a purely heterosexua l subj ective identity, a nd from others by passing as s t raight. The court's ex a mple
forgives these lies a nd builds them into the scheme of state enforcement.
Halley, supra note 5, a t 950.
213
Anonymous Interview Number One, supra note 35 .
2 14
Barnette , 3 19 U.S . a t 641.
2 15
!d . a t 642.

